Almost ignored by the mainstream media, Stephen Blake’s (Director of the State Department's Mainland Southeast Asia Office) recent visit to Naypyidaw highlights the U.S. foreign policy turnabout under the Obama/Clinton ticket.
Even if Washington maintains a U.S. Embassy in the former Burmese capital of Rangoon and low intensity diplomatic relations with Burma has never been cut off, it was the first time that a high-level official headed for the new jungle capital to confer with military regime Foreign Minister. The official New Light of Myanmar newspaper emphasized the meeting as a cordial discussion “on issues of mutual interest and promotion of bilateral relations”: a sudden shift in tone compared with the fierce anti-American propaganda of the last decade.
The day after the visit, U.S. State Department tried to pour oil on troubled waters, making it clear that it was just a diplomatic routine and in no way it should have been interpreted as an indication of an imminent turning point in bilateral relations. But it’s important to weigh Blake’s mission in the light of Hillary Clinton’s remarks about an incoming review of U.S. sanctions policy against the Burmese regime, branded as “ineffective”. Actually, some significant elements point out that the current sanctions system - strengthened many times since 1997, when it was first introduced - is going to be eased or even revoked in the future. One indirect confirmation has come from a Burmese opposition representative that, after a talk with Blake, revealed that U.S. could withdraw some general measures while keeping operative other targeted provisions. And, at the end of last week, insiders at Foggy Bottom reaffirmed that U.S. would be open to direct talks with the junta, either in form of bilateral contacts or in a framework similar to the fruitless six-nation talks on North Korean nuclear issue.
If this were the case, U.S. State Department officials will have to explain very well the cause-and-effect relationship between mitigating sanctions and promoting democracy in Burma. At first sight, that connection looks quite obscure. In fact, if it’s true that embargoes have hardly ever helped democratic transitions, it’s also indisputable that sanctions removals per se have never achieved such result, without a clear and verifiable commitment in terms of liberalization and genuine reforms from the implicated regimes.
So, the fundamental question is: in exchange for what is Obama holding out his hand to the same generals who stifled and impoverished a once prosperous nation?
In Burma, repression is today harsher than ever, political opponents’ are being convicted in secret trials in spite of international appeals, and power consolidation plans by the military are in full progress (see 2010 electoral farce). In such a context, Western sanctions have made no difference for Burmese people, whose situation was extremely precarious even before their application: thus, in Burma’s case “collateral damages” rhetoric cannot be pleaded. If effectiveness of sanctions has been seriously curtailed by economic support from Asian neighbours, the ethical reasons that suggested their imposition are still sound: to hit the businesses and the grip on power of a regime that monopolize the whole economy of the country. But, instead of pushing for a widespread enforcement of the embargo – a step that could really change its outcome -, Obama profits from its alleged failure to offer the dictators his cooperation: a discouraging message sent to freedom fighters and human rights activists inside and outside Burma, apart from the real purposes of the new strategy. It’s however possible that Washington, still lacking an overall plan, is just trying to show a less uncompromising picture in order to get some apparent diplomatic success, for the benefit of the international community. Aung San Suu Kyi’s release from house arrest could serve the purpose, a card the ruling junta has repeatedly played in the last 20 years to ease international pressure: with more than 2000 political prisoners behind bars and an opposition reduced to its lowest ebb, Sr. Gen. Than Shwe could afford to free her for the third time, before or soon after next year’s rigged elections. At that point the U.S. and Western countries will be able to light-heartedly fill Burmese general’s strongboxes again.
Enzo Reale is a freelance journalist. He writes about South-East Asia issues for Italian online newspapers and magazines. He edits two blogs (http://1972.splinder.com and http://asiaedintorni.blogosfere.it).
