Don't Count On The Army To Split

by Maung Htun

Monday, 24 March 2008 00:00

After reading Larry Jagan's "Splits emerge in Burma's army over country's roadmap," [Mizzima News – March 21, 2008] I want to relate some of my personal experiences and observations. As for myself, I am a distant relative of Brigadier Aung Gyi, a one time close confidant of Burma's military dictator Ne Win who later became an outspoken critic of the dictator, and my father worked at the Defense Ministry for many years. One day in July 1988, my father came home with a sad face and told me what he heard in a meeting. Colonel Aung Thein, of the Defense Ministry, had criticized Aung Gyi's open letters to Ne Win, imploring the dictator to enact economic and political reforms. At the end of the meeting Aung Thein told those present that they would defend their government at any cost and if necessary they would kill one million people. Aung Thein reportedly went on to say that the killing of a million people out of a population of 38 million would simply mean the military would then find it, "Even easier to control the country." My father and other veteran, low ranking officers just shook their heads and returned to their offices, sadly discussing what would happen next with all of them believing that there would be bloodshed in the coming months. A few days later Aung Gyi and colleagues were arrested and sentenced to death. Then, in 1988, came the most famous uprising in Burma's history and Aung Gyi was released from Insein prison. He said to me, "There may be a handful of extremists in the army, but they cannot do anything except listen to Ne Win's orders to hold an election and hand over power to the newly elected government." I was quite excited by his comments and joined the National League for Democracy (NLD), working for the NLD until the election. Aung Gyi would often mention that when he was in charge of the Defense Services Academy (DSA) in Ba Htoo, Tun Kyi and Maung Aye were cadets of the DSA's 1st batch. Both of them had held the Union flag and sworn to defend democracy. Therefore the regime, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), in his mind would definitely hold an election." He believed in those two commanders and hoped they would cooperate with him, as Chairman of the NLD. But it was not to be. Instead, he was humiliated and impeded on his trips to Upper Burma and Shan State before the election. Aung Gyi had tried to garner army support with the words, "Do not think wrong about Tatmadaw," which only earned him the hatred of the people. He truly believed that Tun Kyi and Maung Aye would stand firm for democracy. But, in reality, they were so corrupt and never thought about what Aung Gyi expected. From the outside we think there can be moderate generals or some that may have some sympathy toward the opposition. Actually, we are dreaming and it will never happen. We have to understand the mentality and attitude of the army officers. They always want to make sure that their role is important and their wealth is well maintained. They will not risk anything that could harm these two interests. Aung Gyi was second chief of staff in the Burmese army in 1962. He later knew that Ne Win was heading the wrong way and no longer saw things eye to eye with him like before 1962. Aung Gyi was quite popular and the U.S. government was watching him as a potential, new flamboyant leader of Burma. On several occasions Ne Win left the country in Aung Gyi's hands as he journeyed to England to relieve stress, attend horse races and go for medical check-ups. Aung Gyi had a chance to assume power and steer the country's future in a different direction. But, he did not. As a consequence, he was sent to prison and the country was ruled by the whims of Ne Win for 26 years, in the process becoming one of the poorest nations in the world. In 1974, General Tin Oo was chief of staff of Burma's army and he too was quite popular throughout the country and recognized as a good soldier. People expected him to take over power from Ne Win, but that also didn't happen. Like Aung Gyi, he was sent to prison and several young army officers were sentenced to death. Many world leaders regarded Khin Nyunt as a moderate leader among the generals of SLORC, or the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) as the military junta came to refer to itself as in 1997. He was Secretary 1, in charge of Military Intelligence and later appointed Prime Minister. But Khin Nyunt, as with those before him, didn't and couldn't do anything to take over power. What I want to say is that in the Burma army the high ranking officers are just happy in their positions even though they know the country is not in good shape under their rule. They will not risk anything unless their role and wealth is guaranteed. They will not harm each other as they have the same interests. Khin Nyunt was a danger to a majority of them and thus he was forced out. To make sure that happens, they also arrange marriages of their children among themselves. A majority of the top ranking generals and their families are related to each other through marriage. Younger army officers may get frustrated with the current situation or the growing power of the junta-backed mass civilian organization Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), but they will not do anything due to respect for their elders and in the interest of the security of their positions. They have been trained like that for many years. Many of my friends were in the DSA 19 and 20 intakes and some of them are now regional commanders. I had a good discussion about the situation of the country with some them in 1988 just before the 8-8-88 uprising. Their view was as long as they can look after their families, they don't care about anything else. They will just obey orders. Soon, this generation will come into power. Challenging leadership is quite common in Western society but with the traditions and nature of Buddhism and the Burmese people, I don't believe that someone will stage a soft or hard coup in Naypyitaw, even though there may be a rift or split among the ranks of the military. Historically, Burmese people need full support from an outside power to foment change. Aung San sought the Japanese army's help to fight against the British and the aide of the British in ridding the Japanese from Burma. Nothing has changed. As I mentioned in the beginning, regarding the ominous words of Aung Thein in 1988, the army will again move to use all violence necessary in suppressing the aspirations of the people. They won't hesitate to kill more as their hands are already soaked with blood. Many political leaders, including Aung Gyi, Aung San Suu Kyi and Tin Oo, underestimate this fact. Many times these leading figures have said that with the economic crisis, the army officers can no longer hold the power. But, actually, they have held on to power for almost 20 years already and nothing will change for years to come. The poorer the country, the easier it is for them to rule. There is no shortage of thugs for whom a daily wage will ensure their work on behalf of the military regime whenever there is political movement calling for change. Naively, we were hoping that there would be a change after Ne Win's death, but nothing happened. We believed that Ne Win was the puppet master and when he died the SPDC generals would not know what to do. We were hoping for a change with the help of U.N. envoys Razali and Gambari, yet nothing has happened. Now, as per the referenced article, are we to hope that Maung Aye or Shwe Mann will get rid of Senior General Than Shwe and implement true reform? How long do we have to wait? Is it really going to happen? I don't think so. In my view, unless there is an uprising even bigger than 1988 and many powerful international actors simultaneously pressure the regime – with a few missiles hitting Naypyitaw, the junta's administrative capital – there will be no split in the Burma army, even with a change of leadership. Next >