Disaster diplomacy – of tsunamis and cyclones, Burma after Cyclone Nargis

Christopher Smith

Saturday, 03 May 2008 19:48

After three decades of conflict and civil war in Indonesia's restive province of Aceh came to a relatively rapid political solution in the aftermath of December 2004's devastating earthquake and tsunami, the concept of natural disasters as paving the road for conflict transformation has gained in both adherents and interest. But, as this brief comparison between the situation in Aceh in 2004 and that of Burma today will make clear, there is scant evidence for optimism in the devastation of Cyclone Nargis proving the memorable catalyst of a solution to Burma's ills. The fact is, as recognized by numerous studies as well as disasterdiplomacy.org, and poignantly attested to in the case of Sri Lanka in the wake of the 2004 tsunami, natural disasters have historically led to a spike in conflict as opposed to bringing a solution to light. Even in Aceh, though a political solution would prove forthcoming, the Indonesian armed forces (TNI) used the opportunity created by the aftermath of the tsunami to accuse its foes of terrorism and launch a series of military offensives.  Crucially, in the case of Aceh, mediation and scheduled negotiations between the primary protagonists to the conflict, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian government, were underway prior to the tsunami. While a foreseeable solution to the conflict was by no means certain before December 26, 2004, the groundwork had been laid for the exploration of a solution.  Clearly in the case of Burma, as exemplified by the lack of measures taken to ensure that the forthcoming constitutional referendum will be held in an atmosphere conducive to the poll providing a real step forward for the country, there currently exists no definable platform prepared and agreed to by the military and opposition political parties ready to serve the interests of conflict transformation. The thrust of the United Nations efforts through its Special Envoy to Burma, Ibrahim Gambari, is currently dead in the water.  Additionally, the sheer statistical weight of the 2004 tsunami necessary to add that vital extra incentive to find a political solution in Aceh, is mind boggling. Of a pre-tsunami population of approximately 4.2 million, an estimated 170,000 to 230,000 people perished, with a further half million left homeless. Those numbers equate to a death toll between four and 5.4 percent of the Acehnese population, with nearly 12 percent left in need of shelter.  Burma, hopefully, will not suffer near the loss in life and property as did the Acehnese. However, it is far too early to know of the true devastation wrought on Burma as a result of Cyclone Nargis, and it may well be that casualty and damage figures skyrocket in the upcoming days and weeks. But if Nargis were to have a similar statistical impact on the human population of Burma as the tsunami did on Aceh, between 1.9 and 2.6 million Burmese will have lost their lives, with another 5.6 million homeless.  Militarily, the 2004 tsunami dealt a significant blow to both GAM and TNI short-term operational capabilities in Aceh. Though what is more important is that in the preceding two-plus years GAM is estimated to have lost over 25 percent of its troop strength in conjunction with the loss of key commanders on the ground. In short, the military arm of GAM was standing at a severe lilt at the time the tsunami struck, with many analysts arguing that the organization was looking for a way to exit the conflict prior to the tsunami.  With Burma, the Saffron Revolution, barely seven months past, has instilled newfound optimism and reason to believe in the strength and cause of those opposing current government policies. Additionally, when speaking of possible diplomacy and dialogue, it is commonly understood that a principle obstacle to talks is the military's refusal to be brought to the table. It is unlikely that Cyclone Nargis can cause losses in the military significant to impel such an action. Even in Aceh, where the TNI lost 2,700 killed and saw much of its coastal operations obliterated (compared to a GAM figure of only 70 deaths), it was contingent upon the opposition, GAM, to make the necessary political concessions to allow talks to substantively progress. Early 2005 saw Aceh inundated with international aid workers and relief efforts, providing the conflict a degree of internationalization it was previously not privy too. The carnage brought upon the region also spawned political actors to reduce the moral posturing of their demands and interests. What international relief is permitted to reach Burma's citizens will presumably come without the international aid worker component, and certainly out of the eye of the international media. And with Burma's conflict, especially from the position of its central democratic opposition, steeped in and committed to the morality of its cause – it is difficult to imagine opposition leaders and parties coming together in the wake of the cyclone to agree to a lessening of their moral position.  Despite some thirty years of hostilities and government offensives in Aceh, in the months following the disaster over 80 percent of Acehnese polled responded with a favorable view of the Indonesian government's relief initiatives.  Burma's military junta, isolated, poor and carrying the burden of a far less than stellar track record regarding social spending and initiatives, in all probability will not see their relief efforts heralded by 80 percent of Burmese as sufficient and meriting a more positive view of the military in Burmese political affairs.  In the end, there are fundamental obstacles to the success of disaster diplomacy in Burma in the wake of Cyclone Nargis, factors that were not in place in Aceh in 2004. Aceh was a regional crisis, comprising two percent of the Indonesian population, not a national one as in the case of Burma. Will Nargis traumatize all of Burma?  The political and armed opposition to Jakarta in Aceh was not seeking the removal of the Indonesian government or national political changes to the vast extent as several opposition parties in Burma are seeking. Further, GAM entered a peace accord with the Indonesian government having made significant political concessions, including among others their erstwhile claim to independence. GAM joined the existing political order.  Burma's political conflict is stalemated. While the concessions demanded to jumpstart dialogue by the parties concerned are not synonymous with what occurred between GAM and Jakarta, the vital point is that concessions will be required of all parties.  What demands and positions will Burma's political opposition and military rulers be willing to forego in the aftermath of Nargis to make dialogue happen? Is it possible that opposition, pro-democracy leaders would serve within the existing, military, government? But, just maybe – as with the early ripples of a tsunami far out at sea – the aftermath of Nargis will provide a critical opportunity for members of the military and opposition parties to come together and work toward rebuilding Burma; one small, initial step in the confidence building process. And this, it is hoped, would prove the onset of a working relationship that will one day crash upon the shores of Burma and give birth to a unified and conflict-free Burma. < Prev   Next >