Dialogue demands a common vernacular

by Joseph Ball

Tuesday, 12 August 2008 19:06

The United Nation's Special Envoy to Burma, Ibrahim Gambari, is preparing to make yet another foray into the murky world of Burmese politics. A central feature of his mission is to promote a dialogue between the disparate parties – and crucially between the country's military rulers and National League for Democracy head Aung San Suu Kyi. But before there can be any hope of dialogue, those invited to the table must speak a common language. Confronting Burma's generals on democratic principles and international rights is a bona fide non-starter. Such language is not that of career military men with a near-singular infatuation with Myanmar as opposed to an ideology based upon rights and democracy. It is also a military that during the 1950s found the situation in Yugoslavia most comparable to that of Burma – a 'lesson,' whether correct or not, in democratic transformation that will not be lost on the generals. And, despite a persistent increase in the weight of tomes relating to international conventions and rights, the trend on the ground today warns of a consortium of nations nostalgic for the principles conferred at Westphalia in 1648 – as opposed to being beholden to the amassing rights legislation. The passing of the 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P) resolution, codified in 2006 by the United Nations Security Council, would appear to have been further evidence of a world with fewer international barriers and a recognition that the rights of populations in need outstrip the authority previously endowed upon national sovereignty. But passage of R2P was more emblematic of sentiment, and devoid of interest. States act on interest. In fact, R2P can be argued to having been implemented 15 years prior to the historic resolution, with the imposition of the 'No-fly zone' over portions of Iraq in 1991. This United States-led action, in pursuit of national interests but justified by morality, was possible in 1991. Presently, however, the authority of a state or group of states to legitimate national policy on the grounds of morality is severely curtailed – despite the passage of R2P and an expanding human rights discourse. It is argued that the United States, Europe and other countries committed to notions such as democracy have a moral responsibility to come to the aid of an oppressed Burmese population. Perhaps they do. But that moral responsibility is likely no longer sufficient to justify interventions of national interest within the greater and increasingly competitive world of geopolitics – and certainly not without a regional context. It was possible in the dying years of the 20th century for the United States and its allies to mold a Security Council presenting at least a façade of commonality. However, by the second Iraq War of 2003 'international' consensus was no longer possible, though the United States and allies could still act unilaterally. In 2008, neither consensus nor unilateral action – even if couched in the verbiage of universal norms and rights – is possible. Today the United Nations Security Council sounds more like that of 1978 than 1998. Reacting to recent events in Georgia, specifically to both Georgian internal aggression and a Russian response across international boundaries, the United States and Russia stand defiantly opposed, presenting vastly divergent interpretations and both claiming to uphold the moral highground. Further, the military actions of Georgia and Russia were responses to state interests, nothing to do with universal principles – unless one goes back to the supremacy afforded nation-states realized over 350 years ago at Westphalia. While Georgia pleads for United Nations intervention, whatever happens will be most contingent upon competing national interests and power relationships on the ground in the Caucuses. What does this tell us about the current democratic opposition strategy regarding the language needed to confront Burma's generals? Quite succinctly, any strategy which places critical importance on the primacy of the Security Council, 'international' intervention or the recognition of universal human rights and democratic principles is a policy of political stagnation. This does not mean opposition activists and supporters need to sacrifice their democratic and rights principles, and their goals of a democratic Burma enshrining the said rights. But it does ask them to pursue such goals through a dialogue constructed around language and values to which a highly nationalistic military government can relate. Any civilian opposition to military rule voicing disapproval through the context of political system and rights will be understood by military authorities already lacking legitimacy as subversive. Thus, regardless of what could be deemed a public advancement of the universal human rights doctrine, the central feature of any dialogue with Naypyitaw – especially at the state level – must be one of national security, patriotism and even economic progress. And such an approach over time will lend itself to the creation of more space in civil society, an arena which can then be exploited to work for the further enhancement of democratic principles and individual rights. It is insufficient to have goals. There must be a means through which the goals are achievable – the elusive 'strategy' of the present opposition. As a verbal means, a democratic and human rights discourse has to date failed – but that need not infer that democracy and human rights are not valid goals. Of central importance to the success of any process of dialogue, and/or national reconciliation, will be the advent of a common vernacular means between the disparate groups. Burma's military machine is unlikely to deviate in its posture and language, but can the opposition demonstrate the flexibility and creativity needed to alter the status quo? One indication that they are able to do just that – and an approach Gambari would be wise to advocate – would be if their demands and desires for the country are conveyed in a language the military understands and respects. Otherwise, the different sides – even if seated at the same table – will continue speaking past one another.   < Prev   Next >