A major headache and unfinished task for the junta is the disarming of ceasefire groups, while making sure to maintain complete control of both the groups and the territories in question.
However, tt the same time, the armed ceasefire groups themselves have to weigh the changing regional political situation to ensure their own survival. As a consequence, there are growing power struggles within their own organizations.
The junta has struck temporary ceasefire deals with several armed groups over the last two decades, neutralizing the rural front and allowing the regime to focus on the threat that emerged on the urban front in the aftermath of the 1988 uprising. In other words, the junta consoled leaders of restive armed subversive groups by bribing them with lucrative economic benefits.
As a consequence, 'revolution' diminished in the hearts of some ceasefire group leaders. And while most of the rural population is still waiting for better days, they may in fact be doomed.
Though the guns have indeed fallen silent to some extent, the life of local ethnic people nevertheless continues to get more difficult. The only way out for many is to find their way to regional countries, through back doors, and earn money by doing jobs other people don't want.
As the junta is determined to win victory by all possible means in the forthcoming 2010 general election, agreements with some ceasefire groups might be extended.
But the junta is preparing to dismantle all temporary measures, including these ceasefire agreements. It's just a matter of time. The junta is buying time and using 'divide and rule' tactics with the aim of eventually winning through attrition.
And when this happens, only one question will remain. What will these ceasefire groups do? Will they deal with the junta separately and decide what's best for their own organization? Or will they find a comprehensive solution for all and which is also to their long-term benefit?
