Whether in central-government-dominated reaches of Kachin State, such as the capital of Myitkyina, or in regions under Kachin Independence Organisation control such as the town of Laiza, a three-hour drive to the north, there is a pervading sense of ominous hostilities on the horizon between troops of the Burmese Army and Kachin Independence Army.
With the conclusion of this month’s general election, which failed to legitimate the participation of the Kachin ethnic leaders, combined with KIO refusal to transform its armed wing into a Border Guard Force operating under the command of the Burmese Army, relations between Naypyidaw and the Kachin opposition leadership are arguably at their lowest point since the 1994 ceasefire pact was signed. A Kachin businesswoman recently responded to the possibility of renewed hostilities that she was certain such a contest would see the Kachins emerge as the loser; a sentiment echoed by others within Myitkyina’s Kachin community. However, and also mirroring her kindred, she was proud and happy that the KIO would fight. Taken with recent military posturing on the part of government forces and the slow strangulation of vital economic links servicing KIO administered regions, war it would appear is but a fait accompli awaiting the order to “fire”.
Throughout the Kachin community of Myitkyina there is great animosity and angst felt towards Burma’s central government. And even if the KIO as a set-piece military faction ceases to exist after hostilities with government forces, it can be expected that a low-intensity guerrilla war would prevail throughout Kachin State, with a distinct possibility of violence spreading beyond the state’s porous borders.
For a country that has not witnessed a year without civil conflict since achieving independence in 1948, a return to a hot war in yet another region would bode ill for any hoped for path towards national reconciliation and development.
Only by recognising the desires of the Kachin people as well as the state’s paramount security interests within a broader national political framework can further decades of debilitating armed confrontation be avoided and the best interests of institutions and people realised.
Sixty-two years of cyclical acrimony, greed and violence in Burma’s frontier regions have greatly contributed to the deplorable atmosphere of physical, economic and social security for vast portions of the country’s population while simultaneously retarding the state’s own development as an arbiter of responsible government, domestically and internationally.
In short, a drastic change in the mental culture within the continuing Burmese crisis is needed – an embrace of peace and co-operation allowing the country and its people to finally achieve their true potential.
