Escalation of inter-ethnic conflict in the midst of Myanmar’s Spring Revolution

Escalation of inter-ethnic conflict in the midst of Myanmar’s Spring Revolution

As the Myanmar people’s Spring Revolution picks up pace, a crucially important question hangs in the air – are Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) going to back the people’s fight against the Military junta?

What many people view as the ideal scenario would have all the EAOs endorsing and supporting the people’s Spring Revolution, and the National Unity Government (NUG), in their struggle to reverse the Military’s seizure of power that rolled out five months ago on 1 February.

Instead, some major EAO players appear unwilling to play ball and are sitting on the side-lines, squabbling.

The heavyweight EAOs with thousands of troops - while sympathetic to the people's revolution - are still not cooperating with any wish to build a formidable counter military force against the Myanmar Military or Tatmadaw, largely due to their incompatible political outlook.

Only a minor EAO stumped up with 200 armed fighters to join the NUG, though some Kachin, Karen and Karenni EAOs have been supportive in terms of offering sanctuary and some training.

But this leaves an elephant in the room when it comes to heavily armed players in the hills of northern Shan State.

Scrambling to arm

The NUG is attempting to add steel to the fight. Since May 5, a growing number of People’s Defence Forces (PDF) – made up of eager young civilians – have taken sanctuary and begun military training in ethnic areas with the aim to penetrate back in the Bamar populated regions to fight against the Tatmadaw. Some of these PDF pledge formal allegiance to the NUG, some do not. Few are properly armed.

The aim at the outset was to form a Federal Union Army (FUA), which it now called the Federal Alliance, together with the EAOs.

But several weeks down the line there is no sign that this will materialize.

Instead - to the chagrin of the civilian people’s revolutionaries - most EAOs are focused on their home ground, showing little or no sign they wish to join a coordinated countrywide pushback against the common enemy.

Northern Shan State

What may be particularly galling for some observers is the proxy-like war that has escalated in northern Shan State, seemingly out of sync with the people’s Spring Revolution.

The question arises as to why the Shan State-based EAOs are unlike the Kachin, Karen and Karenni EAOs which to some extent are responding to the people's call and why are they pitted against each other rather than responding to the people's aspirations to oust the Tatmadaw?

When attempting to assess the dynamics at play, the crux could be as much about holding territory as it is about who is backing them – in simple terms, China versus the West.

The EAOs are divided into United Wa State Army (UWSA)-led and the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement-Signatory-EAOs (NCA-S-EAOs) groups. The former is politically under the alliance of Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC), while the latter is represented by the Peace Process Steering Team (PPST) in deliberations and bargaining for political settlement with the government.

The political alliance FPNCC is made up of United Wa State Army (UWSA), National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP), Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and Arakan Army (AA).

The ten ethnic armed organizations signatory to the NCA are the Karen National Union (KNU), Chin National Front (CNF), All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF), Karen National Liberation Army-Peace Council (KNLA/PC), Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO), Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU).

The FPNCC members have two separate military alliances. One is the National Alliance-Burma (NA-B), which includes the KIA, AA, MNDAA or Kokang and TNLA. The second is called the Three Brotherhood Alliance, made up of the AA, MNDAA and TNLA, without the KIA.

The SSPP being in the FPNCC camp is under the sway of the UWSA which in turn is under the influence of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and thus is considered a reliable ally. In the past during the era of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) until thend of 1980s, the pro-CPB SSPP faction headed by the late legendary Sao Sam Mong went to China and even received a huge cache of arms during that time.

The RCSS based along Thai border in the south of Shan State is considered pro-West as it is dependent on Thailand for a lot of basic necessities to maintain its troops.

In short, it could be said the SSPP and RCSS are ideologically opposite to each other. In the past, it was differentiated and categorized as people's democracy versus national democracy.

Generally, the NUG inability to woo the EAOs to form a federal army or at least as a political and military alliance may be because it hasn't been able to explain to them why the National League for Democracy (NLD) dominate the political decision-making power, why it failed to really implement ethnic equality and collective leadership in the new NUG set up, all in its quest to establish a federal democratic union.

Troubled recent history

To get an insight into the stand-off in northern Shan State, it is important to look at recent history.

Following the signing of Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) on October 15, 2015 in November some hundreds of the RCSS troops moved up north and armed clashes erupted in November the same year in Namkham area with the TNLA. And since then the two parties have been on a war-footing and clashing on-and-off all these years.

The two Shan armies’ animosity started as the SSPP in July 2018 joined the TNLA in its war against the RCSS in Hsipaw Township.

Subsequently, the armed confrontation took a new turn as the SSPP-TNLA combined forces openly with a declaration to evict the RCSS from northern Shan State and then launched offensives, claiming that it is not its territory and should go back to its original south stomping ground.

Thus, the inter-EAO conflict has played out not only between the TNLA and RCSS but also between the two Shan armies of SSA South or RCSS and SSA North or SSPP.

The RCSS has reinforced its troops several time counting in the thousands after 2015 and possibly also recruited locally in northern Shan State among the Shan population.

The SSPP and TNLA accused the RCSS of intruding into their areas, while the latter said that it has been there since 2005 and besides it has all the right to operate in all areas of Shan State as a Shan army.

The contested or disputed areas are Namtu, Hsipaw, Kyaukme, Namkham in northern Shan State, and Kehsi and Mong Kung in central Shan State.

During these years the armed conflict between the adversaries has been going on-and-off sometimes intensively and sometimes not. Needless to say, the local population have to flee the fighting from time to time, sometimes in their hundreds, sometimes in their thousands, depending on the intensity of the armed clashes.

Recent developments

Aside from the normal armed clashes in northern Shan State that usually occurred the RCSS lately has been losing ground in the Namkham area close to the China border, according to Shan sources.

Most recently, on July 1, the SSPP/TNLA combined force delivered heavy firefights in Kyaukme Township of Tow San village-tract which have been going on for some days. Casualties are still unknown, although the displaced persons are said to number a thousand if not more, according to a Shan News report.

But the one that stands out is the fierce armed engagement in Kehsi Township along Loi Hun mountain range which has flared up in June and been going on for a month now deploying thousands of troops on both sides.

According to Shan News, the two Shan armies said that they won't withdraw from Loi Hun mountain range by any means.

Starting from June 1, the two armies have been reinforcing their troops in the hundreds, according to their spokesmen.

News is making the rounds that some 2,000 fully armed UWSA troops with 107 military trucks have been reinforcing the SSPP. But the UWSA and as well the SSPP denied this. However, locals said that they can differentiate the Wa from the Shan and that the Wa soldiers are definitely there alongside the SSPP troops. In addition, locals said Palaung-speaking soldiers wearing SSPP uniforms were also said to be seen.

The dispute stemmed from the RCSS taking over of the mountain range when the SSPP was busy resisting the Tatmadaw offensives in Kehsi and Mong Hsu areas in 2017. According to SSPP the RCSS established its administrative apparatus in villages on the mountain range and it has to retaliate, said its spokesman Major Sai Hpong Han.

He said that Loi Hun is only about 10 miles away from Wanhai and within the reach of artillery fire and that SSPP has to consider its security. In contrast the RCSS headquarters is 200 miles away, he added.

To date some 2,000 residents from Loi Hun area have been displaced. And according to a United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs report of June 24, around 1,660 civilians had recently been displaced in Kehsi and Mongkeung townships by the clashes.

SSPP preferred partner of China?

An opinion piece in Shan News recently reported the following which may indicate that China is asserting its wish in Shan State's war theatre, endorsing the SSPP.

In early May, a SSPP Captain Hsai Nga Mong, leading a large force, arrived in Manhio Sub township, also commonly known as “19 Villages”, north of the Mao-Shweli river which has been a base of the RCSS Task Force 701 since 2005. He reportedly held a meeting with the local people to inform them: “We are here because the Chinese authorities across the border don’t want the RCSS to remain here,”

Late in May, an RCSS officer sought audience with a Yangon-based Chinese embassy official who told him quite frankly: “The RCSS originated from the late Bo Moe Hein’s SURA (Shan United Revolutionary Army) which was staunchly anti-communist. While the SSPP was an ally of the CPB (Communist Party of Burma) and still regarded as a good friend. So, when you say you are not an agent of the United States, and your forces in the north would protect the Chinese interests in northern Shan State, how can we believe in your words? If the SSPP can’t make you withdraw, we have other ways to make it happen.”

On 5 June, Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar Chen Hai met Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. A few days before the meeting, news came out that China did not want RCSS troops in the north.

The FPNCC in March 2016 met in Panghsang and issued a statement demanding the RCSS to withdraw from northern Shan State, giving an ultimatum that if it didn't comply forcible eviction will follow. However, so far nothing serious has happened to change the military balance and the on-and-off military clashes have continued.

Given the FPNCC is being influenced by China, with the exception of the KIA, some even consider the rest of the members its proxies.

Speculation is that with the 1 February military coup, anti-Chinese feelings have been on the rise

among the people of Myanmar due to China's support of the coup-maker junta. The situation escalated even to the point that some Chinese owned business factories were burned down, including an attack and killing of the three security personnel guarding the Chinese oil and gas pipelines in May in Mandalay Region.

What next?

That said, is war between the SSPP/TNLA and the RCSS a proxy war or a new Cold War?

There are a lot of indications that this is such a stand-off - the boasting of SSPP officer in Namkham that the Chinese prefer its organization compared to the RCSS; the outright opinion of the Chinese diplomat that the RCSS is not wanted on its doorstep; and the likely angst of China that its already invested businesses needing a security guarantee due to the chaotic situation in Myanmar.

The likely sudden affirmative endorsement given to the UWSA and possibly the TNLA in combination with the SSPP to evict the RCSS may well be the signal that this proxy war is actually underway.

At this point it is not clear what the RCSS will do to counter the onslaught and rebuff claims it is influenced by Thailand and thus is firmly in the pro-West camp.

For now, the EAOs in Shan State are consumed by inter-ethnic and inter-EAO conflicts, either as proxies or to gain territory. The situation might even gradually morph into a new Cold-War if the armed conflict spreads to the Thai border – one side backed by China and one side backed by Thailand and the West.

At a time when the people of Myanmar are looking to the ethnic armed kingmakers for help, all they find is the kingmakers squabbling amongst themselves.

Sai Wansai for Mizzima