Independent Myanmar media funding since the coup

01 February 2023
Independent Myanmar media funding since the coup
A journalist films as riot police fire tear gas at demonstrators during a protest against the military coup, near Myaynigone in Yangon, Myanmar, 27 February 2021. Photo: EPA

1 February 2023, marks two years since the Myanmar military launched its latest coup to thwart the democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar.

It has been a period of sustained confrontation, with hostilities documented in a vast majority of townships across the country.

Hostilities pitting the junta against a range of opponents – from ousted National League for Democracy (NLD) patrons and the newly formed National Unity Government (NUG) to the nationwide Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), to locally established People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) and a range of Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations (EROs).

The conflict has uprooted millions from their homes, wreaked havoc on the economy and engulfed the country in an atmosphere of fear and oppression.

Yet throughout these two years, Myanmar’s independent media has continued to report and broadcast from inside the country on a daily basis. Those providing this invaluable service do so with the threat of arrest or worse stalking their daily existence. They are not only putting their own lives at stake, but those of their family members as well.

Independent media groups, such as Mizzima, found themselves directly in the crosshairs of the post-coup junta.

It is no exaggeration to say that 1 February 2021 was supposed to spell the end for independent media in Myanmar. But, rather than capitulate in the face of threats and hostilities, independent Myanmar media groups have instead significantly grown their reach and even diversified their platforms to adapt to the needs of the Myanmar people.

The coup has highlighted the importance of independent media to the people of Myanmar, providing a counter narrative to that of the junta’s propaganda machine and offering a vision for a federal, democratic Myanmar free from the diktats of the Tatmadaw.

Within this highly restrictive and complex media environment, there is no question that donor funding has contributed to the ability of Myanmar’s independent media to sustain, and even grow, its operations.

However, the conflict in Myanmar has also highlighted significant shortfalls in support for Myanmar’s independent media. This shortfall has several underlying causes, including differing appreciations of the Myanmar conflict as well as conflicting priorities on the part of donor agencies and Myanmar’s media community.

Ideally, the international community (or significant portions thereof) would come to see an investment in a post-junta federal, democratic Myanmar as intrinsic to national interests. Tellingly, though coverage of the Myanmar conflict dominates the Myanmar media little is seen about it in the international media, even though there is a network of independent Myanmar media reporters working across the country who could supply content about the conflict to an international audience.

This lack of coverage with regard to Myanmar is in stark contrast to the coverage afforded the Ukraine crisis, which has dominated Western media from its onset, almost exactly one year after the junta’s coup in Myanmar.

It must be said that Myanmar’s independent media stands firmly with the people of Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression, but this does not obfuscate the fact that Western countries rushed to support Ukraine in their perceived self-interest, while largely leaving the people of Myanmar to fend for themselves.

A similar reaction is seen in the donor community, but this should not come as a surprise. As it should be clear by now to everyone in the anti-junta opposition, Myanmar is not a top priority of the international community. This is something the Tatmadaw has understood from the onset, and one of the reasons it felt secure in launching its coup.

On the other hand, it is countries like Thailand and India which must bear the burden of the crisis in Myanmar with many thousands of people from Myanmar being sheltered by these countries.

The post-coup support from these two countries to Myanmar’s independent media has been remarkable and stands in stark contrast to the support provided by certain Western countries.

Surprisingly, this support exists despite the tendency for illiberal legislation throughout much of the region.

From a donor perspective, then, investing in Myanmar's independent media is enabling freedom of speech in Southeast Asia, a region where there is little incentive to protect freedom of expression domestically. There are few resources available to defend freedom of expression across the region and independent media's critical voices are essential for free speech to flourish.

Under the circumstances, Myanmar's independent media is one of a few exceptions in the region that can exercise freedom of speech without being marred by restrictive legislation.

Despite months of coup predictions, most governments and observers were largely unprepared for the events of 1 February 2021. This included almost all donor organisations supporting Myanmar's independent media, even though many had worked in Myanmar for nearly a decade.

There seemed to be a general feeling that the military was posturing itself to emasculate the civilian politicians and force a compromise from elected officials. But some semblance of democratic governance would surely prevail. It did not, in short, make “sense” for the Tatmadaw to launch a coup.

What these assessments failed to account for was an understanding of the Myanmar military from both a personal and institutional standpoint.

Moreover, many governments and international organisations had significant investments in the democratic process in Myanmar. These investments tended to act as blinkers to the steadily deteriorating domestic environment. There was, for example, the well-funded peace process which achieved little to nothing. But, people wanted to see a success story and valued their relationships with the authorities.

Additionally, the impunity with which the Tatmadaw could attack the Rohingya population failed to impress upon the international community the fragility of the NLD-led government.

Similarly, a lack of appreciation for the current Myanmar situation hinders donors from providing the full necessary support for the country’s independent media.

The support that is given, for which the Myanmar media community is truly grateful, demonstrates an understanding on the part of the donor community of the basic need to support Myanmar’s

independent media. But the support falls well short of the overall needs of the media community, as donors – with their own interests in mind – are sensitive to upsetting the junta and host countries.

This dynamic of donor funding, it should be stressed, is not unique to the situation of Myanmar and something similar was also witnessed in post-1988 Myanmar.

Having been caught off guard by the 2021 coup, some donors took six months or more to commence their support for Myanmar's independent media. The response was, and continues to be, hampered by stringent guidelines for funding and accountability which do not account for the reality of the Myanmar situation, along with significant delays in the approval of available funds from back donors.

Guidelines that assume these organisations are carrying out operations somewhere that has some semblance of normality continue to be the most commonly used, even though they are clearly inappropriate for Myanmar. While donors have by and large politely listened to calls by the Myanmar media sector to relax the rules that guide their funding, some of which have been made obsolete in the wake of the coup, the response from the donor community with respect to such an appeal has been at best a mixed bag.

To provide one example of funding failing to account for the dynamics of the situation in Myanmar, one independent media outlet – already stretched for resources – had to quickly relocate from inside Myanmar to Thailand after they faced charges filed by the regime relating to their content. But there was no timely support available for the media group because donors needed to review the request for funding for two to five months.

The media group could not stop its work. As a result, it had to manage with whatever scant resources were available for their relocation costs and could provide only a meagre monthly salary to staff in Thailand, while they awaited the machinations of the donor community to run their course.

On the other hand, other funding is being awarded in the absence of a long-term vision. Some support organisations continue to provide small grants (ranging from USD 1,000 to 5,000) at an individual level with little or no coordination with media organisations or without any proper strategy. As a result, the support money has not been effectively utilized.

This is an example of the tendency of some support organisations to provide short-term support with an eye to maximizing the number of individuals and organisations supported, rather than investing in

independent media in Myanmar with a long-term strategy. This has the effect of creating donor dependence for many independent media organisations. Media organisations thus become “do-dependent” rather than “independent.”

As a result, donor agencies are failing to effectively support Myanmar’s independent media. Though they regularly profess their support for Myanmar’s anti-junta opposition and the country’s independent media, they routinely prioritize organisational interests and agendas in the provision of any support. The result is a drastic shortfall in much needed funding.

To be fair, many donor organisations supporting independent media themselves lack sufficient resources. This can lead to an information deficit as well as an inability to best identify where to focus their actions and/or whom their actions should support.

Faced with this lack of resources, the organisations opt to continue with operations as in a normal situation, unable (or unwilling) to look at and dissect Myanmar’s current needs and the ground situation. Such an approach to “normality” also too often implies that the international community and donors maintain a country strategy that includes the present incarnation of the Myanmar military as a principal stakeholder.

This appeasement of the Myanmar military highlights the conflict of interests between donor countries and organisations and the anti-junta alliance, including Myanmar’s independent media. The latter does not envision a Myanmar that incorporates any progeny of the current junta. This can create a dilemma for the donor community, as they attempt to cultivate ties with both Myanmar’s independent media and the Myanmar military.

In conclusion, we ask that investing in independent Myanmar media come to be seen as investing in the future democratic orientation of the people and the country.

Media must be seen as a bridge between opposition interests to help build trust and articulate a common vision for the future. The message for the future to be conveyed to all anti-junta components, and especially ethnic groups, is that their best interests lie in the realisation of a federal, democratic Myanmar. And that vision is simultaneously in the best interests of the international and donor communities.

To achieve this vision, closer coordination is needed between donors and Myanmar’s independent media so as to identify the means to provide adequate and time-sensitive funding that remains cognizant of the need for accountability. Donors must also be willing to adapt their approaches to fit the realities of the Myanmar situation. Lip service backing of Myanmar’s independent media must be matched with actual support.

It is, in short, time for international supporters to invest in independent media in Myanmar for a common vision of national reconciliation, democratization, federalization, and social equity.

Written by a writer who wishes to remain anonymous