Myanmar: Why calls for a No-Fly Zone won’t take off

13 March 2023
Myanmar: Why calls for a No-Fly Zone won’t take off
Photo: EPA

By Mark Farmaner and Igor Blazevic

Since the military coup began in February 2021, the Myanmar military has become increasingly dependent on air power. It has ruthlessly used jets, helicopters and drones to target not only resistance forces, but also deliberately target civilians, including villages and camps for internally displaced people.

Bombs, missiles, and gunfire from the air reign down on homes, schools, churches, monasteries, health clinics and hospitals.

Hundreds of people have lost their lives to airstrikes, and hundreds of thousands of people have been forced to flee their homes, creating a humanitarian crisis. Jets perform daily flyovers without bombing, deliberately preventing displaced people from returning home for fear of further attacks.

The intention is to create a humanitarian crisis that soaks up the capacity of resistance forces, as well as to try to force the population into submission through terror.

Limiting the airpower of the Myanmar military is one of the single most effective steps that the international community could take to address the human rights and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar.

Some governments have started sanctioning Myanmar arms brokers supplying aircraft parts to the Myanmar military. The UK also sanctioned a Russian company for providing aircraft parts used by the Myanmar military. The process of implementation of this type of sanction is moving too slowly and in too limited a way to have any significant impact yet. Not all of the Myanmar companies brokering arms have been sanctioned, and not a single Chinese, Indian or Pakistani company has been sanctioned.

There is also a strong campaign for sanctions on the supply of aviation fuel. If jets can’t fly, they can’t bomb. Under pressure, some companies have already decided to stop supplying aviation fuel to Myanmar. Sanctions on Myanmar companies which are supplying aviation fuel to the Myanmar military have started to be implemented. However, again the pace of implementation of these sanctions is too slow. Sanctions banning the supply of aviation fuel to Myanmar still seem a long way off.

So, as the international community dithers and delays and millions of people in Myanmar live in daily fear of airstrikes, calls have been growing again for a no-fly zone over Myanmar. On the face of it, a no-fly zone could be the answer, completely grounding the Myanmar military air force.

However, in practice, for many reasons, it is very unrealistic to expect that there will be a no-fly zone in Myanmar. Calls for a no-fly zone coming from Myanmar are understandable, but they risk providing people with false hope. Making a call for something that has little or no chance of ever being implemented, particularly if it comes from the side of the political leadership of the anti-junta movement, will raise high expectations which will be, unfortunately, quickly disappointed. Disappointment creates unproductive frustration, takes away energy and confidence, and leads to demoralization. None of those collective emotions are useful to sustain the will for resistance and endurance vis-à-vis a brutal and determined opponent that can be defeated and that is gradually being weakened by the nationwide opposition to the attempted coup.

What is a no-fly zone?

A no-fly zone is where there is a ban on aircraft flying over all or part of a country. The ban can be on all aircraft or on aircraft used for military purposes. A no-fly zone must be enforced by one or more countries, with the threat of shooting down any aircraft which violate the no-fly zone.

Where have no-fly zones happened before?

If we look back to the post-Cold War period, when concepts of humanitarian interventions and the United Nation’s (UN) Responsibility to Protect (R2P) were formulated and for a relatively short period of time gained some traction, there have been numerous situations of mass scale crimes against humanity and dramatic humanitarian emergencies caused by internal or external aggression. However, one may be surprised to find out that no-fly zones have only been utilized three times in history — in parts of Iraq following the 1991 Gulf War; in Bosnia in 1992; and Libya in 2011.

The first no-fly zone was over northern and southern Iraq, to try to prevent the Iraqi dictatorship using airstrikes against ethnic and religious groups in those areas. These no-fly zones were imposed after the Gulf War of 1991. Iraq had invaded Kuwait and the USA and allies went to war to drive Iraq out of Kuwait, whilst also encouraging ethnic and religious minorities to rise up against the Iraqi dictatorship. The USA, France and UK already had a large military presence in the area because the area was a vital source of oil and gas.

The no-fly zone in Bosnia began in 1993 and lasted two and a half years. It was introduced as an additional measure that backed up already significant engagement by the UN in the conflict in Bosnia and the presence of UN peacekeeping troops on the ground since 1992. The no-fly zone in Bosnia was authorized by a United Nations Security Council Resolution, while NATO acted as the implementing force. NATO had at its disposal significant airpower and air bases in close proximity to Bosnia.

In 2011 an uprising against the Libyan dictatorship of Muammar Gaddafi was met with deadly force. Opposition forces initially took control of some cities and civil war followed with armed forces loyal to Gaddafi using ruthless tactics to retake cities, causing a humanitarian crisis which made headline news every day.

The UN Security Council passed a resolution, and a Western-led force, which included some Middle East states, was authorized to impose not just a no-fly zone, but also take offensive action to reduce conflict. Around 19 countries were involved in different aspects of implementing the resolution, with the UK and France leading on implementing the no-fly zone. They were supported by the US, with its superior air control and monitoring capacity. Again, NATO had significant presence, including military airfields in close proximity to Libya. The no-fly zone lasted seven months. Although addressing the humanitarian crisis caused by conflict was a key driving force for the UN intervention at the time, there is still controversy over the Western-led intervention, as Libya has still not been able to form a stable unified government, causing an economic crisis that has left half the population living in poverty.

Although there have been numerous other calls for no-fly zones regarding conflicts in many other countries, in practice there have only ever been these three no-fly zones. No-fly zones only happen in extremely rare circumstances. In all three cases, the US and NATO countries had national security interests in the conflict, they already had significant military presence close to the conflict area, the opponent they were facing had been an authoritarian and militarily relatively weak country and, at that particular moment, there was no neighbour or other big power that strongly opposed international intervention.

Most importantly, all those three cases took place during the time when the US and Western countries dominated international relations in what was called the ‘unipolar world order’. Since then, international relations have gone through profound change. That change has been partly influenced by the rise and assertiveness of China and Russia, which made a big part of their foreign policy effort to undermine and oppose any Western domination over ‘world order’. Last but not least, after the spectacular failures of Western interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, the West itself has become extremely reluctant to get involved in any new military intervention outside its own borders.

At least, that was the case until Russian aggression against Ukraine. But even in the case of Ukraine, the US and European countries promptly rejected early Ukrainian calls for no-fly zones, and have insisted that no NATO soldiers will be directly involved in combat operations.

Who decides if there will be a no-fly zone?

No-fly zones need a legal basis. These can be:

  • A government imposing a no-fly zone over its own territory.
  • A country implementing a no-fly zone over an area for self-defence.
  • A government or coalition of governments implementing a no-fly zone on humanitarian grounds.
  • A UN Security Council resolution.

Why won’t a no-fly zone happen in Myanmar?

Firstly, there is no country currently able and ready to provide planes and other necessary – very complex and very expensive –intelligence, operational and logistics capacity that would be necessary in order to implement a no-fly zone.

Another insurmountable obstacle is that there would be no regional airfields to base operations from. No Myanmar neighbouring country would allow their territory to be used. India would not do it, Bangladesh would not do it, Thailand would not do it. So, the only remaining option would be to have hugely expensive aircraft carriers and support vehicles to spend months at a time off the coast of Myanmar, and being rotated in and out.

The USA has eleven aircraft carriers, the UK two and France only one in operation. With tensions high over Russia and with China over Taiwan, these countries will not want their carriers tied up implementing a no-fly zone over Myanmar. They simply need them somewhere else where the West has its own serious security concerns.

Another very important factor is that no-fly zones are very expensive. Currently, Western defence budgets are under heavy strain with support being provided to Ukraine, and the expectation is that the war in Ukraine will be a protracted one. There is zero political willingness in any Western capital to open a new budget line for a distant conflict where the West has little at stake.

One more very important factor. Imposing a no-fly zone is a serious and risky military operation. It can easily lead to direct confrontation with the opposing side. In order to implement a no-fly zone, the US, probably the only country, in addition to China, that would be capable of imposing a no-fly zone over Myanmar, would need to be ready to bomb whatever anti-aircraft defense and radar system Myanmar has, and would need to be ready to engage in combat with Myanmar jets. It is beyond imagination that the Biden administration would be willing to do so in Myanmar, where the US has no immediate strategic or security interests and to do so at a time when it will have a hard

time to continue giving military support to Ukraine with a Republican majority in the House of Representatives.

Neighbouring countries will be strongly opposed

There is another set of reasons why a no-fly zone is unrealistic any time soon, and most probably never. That is connected with Myanmar’s neighbours.

The attitude of neighbouring countries is an important factor in any decision over a no-fly zone. China, Thailand and India would be strongly opposed to any no-fly zone. With sympathetic Western countries unwilling to even challenge Thailand and India at a high level diplomatically over their supply of arms and revenue to the military, there is no prospect of them going up against them over a no-fly zone.

Thailand is a US treaty country and is, at least within the US Defense Ministry and Pentagon, seen as a critical ally in Southeast Asia. The US is already worried that it is losing Thailand to China, so there is no way that the US would be willing to challenge Thailand over the idea of a no-fly zone in Myanmar, which Thailand would vehemently oppose.

At the moment, the US and EU are ready to go long way to try to persuade India away from its traditional military reliance on Russia. Bringing countries like India and Indonesia closer to the pro-Ukrainian block is what is of significant interest to the West in Asia.

Last but not least, China would be fiercely opposed to any Western country imposing a no-fly zone on its border, and, with tensions already high, Western countries would not want to increase tensions with a no-fly zone. The US and the Quad might be preparing themselves for rivalry with China in the Indo-Pacific, but none of these countries wants to make Myanmar a battleground for a proxy war between the US and China. That is why both the US and China prefer to keep ASEAN ‘centrality’ when it comes to dealing with the Myanmar crisis.

Western countries would also not be able to legitimately implement a no-fly zone on the basis of their own self-defence. Russia and China would veto a UN Security Council resolution implementing a no-fly zone.

Prospects for a no-fly zone

Although the humanitarian crisis caused by airstrikes provides justification for a no-fly zone, there are too many other factors which mean a no fly-zone will not happen. There is a lack of political will,

the opposition of neighbouring countries, the costs of a no-fly zone, and tensions with Russia and China meaning military resources are prioritised for use elsewhere.

Calls for a no-fly zone are justified but will not result in a no-fly zone. The obstacles are too big to overcome. Efforts spent on calling for a no-fly zone will be wasted.

Options for stopping or reducing airstrikes are limited. One of the most effective would be a ban on the supply of aviation fuel, which even sympathetic Western countries have not implemented so far, despite calls from hundreds of Myanmar civil society organisations.

Sanctions on arms brokers providing arms and equipment for aircraft have started to be implemented but more are needed. Chinese, Russian, Indian and Pakistani companies providing aircraft and arms should also be sanctioned.

The people of Myanmar are doing everything they can to resist military rule, but the military they are resisting is funded and armed by the international community. Much more can and must be done to cut off sources of revenue, arms and equipment to the Myanmar military. We must redouble our efforts to stop these sources of revenue and arms.