Reassessing Myanmar’s 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement

By Nicholas Nugent
29 May 2023
Reassessing Myanmar’s 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement
(File) with Chinese Ambassador Hong Liang (back, 2-L), after the 2nd anniversary of Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) ceremony at the Myanmar International Convention Center (MICC) in Naypyitaw, Myanmar, 15 October 2017. Photo: EPA

A new report says the 2015 peace process between Myanmar’s military government and several ethnic armed organisations was a mechanism for strengthening state control rather than a gateway to ethnic peace and reform.

The report was compiled by the Transnational Institute (TNI), an international think tank based in the Netherlands. Subtitled ‘Promoting Ethnic Peace or Strengthening State Control? ’the report’s authors come down in favour of the former.

It concludes that the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement of October 2015 was not a genuine attempt to bring the country’s ethnic armed organisations in from the cold to give them a say in running the nation, says the report. Instead, it was a strategy to strengthen the role of the army, or Tatmadaw, which for much of the country’s 75 years of independence has been engaged in military operations against the armies of those ethnic organisations.

It delves into the history of efforts by governments of Burma, and subsequently Myanmar, to pacify the armed struggles of regional ethnic armies. These began before the end of British rule in February 1947, at the Panglong Conference held at the town of that name in southern Shan State. It was agreed at Panglong that the Shan, Kachin, Chin and other nationalities should have ‘full autonomy ’in the frontier areas they inhabited.

Burma’s independence leader Aung Sang was the chief signatory on behalf of the fledgling government. The day of the signing, 12th February, is celebrated each year as Union Day, a national holiday, though Aung San did not live to see the first anniversary of the signing or foundation of the Union of Burma.

There have subsequently been a succession of peace talks between military leaders and ethnic organisations, notably in 1949, 1958, 1963, 1980-1, 1989, 2011-12 and 2015 till Aung Sang’s daughter, Aung San Suu Kyi, came into power at the head of the National League for Democracy (NLD) government in March 2016.

The NLD inherited the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) signed in October 2015 between the military government and eight armed organisations representing Arakan, Chin, Karen, Pa-O and Shan peoples in a process later dubbed a 21st Century Panglong, or ‘Panglong-21’, by the NLD. Lahu and Mon organisations subsequently joined the agreement but it has never been clear why other armed groups were not invited, or else declined, to take part despite the agreement being labelled a ‘nationwide ’ceasefire.

The implication is that other ethnic forces – including those representing Kachin, Kokang and Ta’ang communities – were excluded by the Tatmadaw from full participation in the accord, remaining at war with the central government. According to the TNI, of the eight ethnic armed organisations (or EAOs) originally included only two were militarily important at the time: the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) once associated with the notorious warlord and drug-runner Khun Sa.

Some absentees from the agreement, like the Kokang-based Myanmar National Democratic Alliance (MNDAA), the Ta-ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Arakan Army/United League of Arakan (AA/ULA), excluded themselves because they were expected to renounce armed struggle before engaging in talks. The report details the precise involvement of each ethnic organisation and suggests the Tatmadaw prefers engaging with groups “that have lost their way” than with political diehards or newcomers to the anti-government armed struggle.

The significance of the 2015 agreement and associated peace process were overshadowed by expectations generated by the National League for Democracy coming into government alongside the Tatmadaw. The internationally-funded Myanmar Peace Center fell into irrelevance as the NLD “put its own stamp on the peace process”.

“Despite Aung San Suu Kyi’s promises of the 21st Century Panglong, the NLD appeared unwilling or unable to establish an inclusive roadmap for peace.” Military representatives in what was, in effect, a coalition government “continued to bring their own agendas to peace negotiation meetings”, says the report.

With fighting in the borderlands increasing, a perception grew that the “key national reconciliation struggle” of the era was not between the government and minority nationalities but between the NLD and Tatmadaw.

By the time Tatmadaw leaders seized power from the NLD in February 2021, there had been no significant progress towards peace between the central government and minorities. “Despite its bold aspirations the NCA did not mark a nationwide breakthrough,” concludes the TNI report. On the contrary a “new cycle of distrust” began to develop between the main signatories.

Critics of the Tatmadaw believe “commanders have used such tactics as peace talks, the declaration of ceasefires and promotion of militia as temporary measures to allow the advancement of government authority into the conflict zones by other means.” This has allowed the Tatmadaw to function as a “state within a state” with no serious commitment to resolving regional conflicts, according to the report.

Commitment to the 2015 peace process was stronger under the government of president (and general) Thein Sein, who stepped down after being defeated by the NLD shortly after signing the NCA. It is arguable too that greater progress in pacifying the borderlands has been made since the 2021 coup by the rival National Unity Government (NUG), which includes representatives of minority communities though lacks power to implement a peace plan.

The TNI report stops short of predicting any future role in government for non-Bamar peoples, though it begs the question of whether Myanmar can ever be united in the way its founding fathers intended. Rather, it seems to be engaged in a constant struggle between the armed forces and ethnic minorities who inhabit around half the land area and all the strategic borderlands.

Since the 2021 coup the struggle has widened as the Tatmadaw’s now counts among its enemies members of the mainstream Buddhist Bamar community campaigning for a return to democratic governance as well as the ethnic and religious minorities making up nearly a third of the country’s total population of 54 million. Hopes that a 21st Century Panglong Conference would unite the diverse land have dimmed alongside those of a democratic future for Myanmar.