SOUTHWARD PUSH: How will China’s influence affect conflict-ridden Shan State?

SOUTHWARD PUSH: How will China’s influence affect conflict-ridden Shan State?
RCSS/SSA troops on parade. Photo: Mizzima

How much are the world’s superpowers at play in the hills of Shan State bordering China?

At a time when the world has its eye on the worsening crisis in Myanmar - in which the main focus is on the conflict between the junta’s military and the people - a nasty spat between Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAO) in Shan State may beggar belief.

The withdrawal of Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA) from Loi Hon, a mountain range in Kesi Township southern Shan State, when the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA), together with its allies the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and United Wa State Army (UWSA), in early July, were poised to attack its outposts, should have ended or lessened the armed conflict.

But this has not been the case. Clashes in northern Shan State have heightened thereafter and also a southward push of the SSPP alliance has been unfolding, starting mid-September.

The recent heavy clashes in RCSS-controlled Mong Kung Township, in southern Shan State, where more than 3,000 locals so far are displaced, indicates that the SSPP alliance is there to stay and armed confrontation for territorial control may exacerbate the situation further.

While at face value this may appear to be a confined local turf war, in the modern-day Great Game that is unfolding, Shan State matters. What is really behind the conflict and how much are Beijing and Washington playing a part?

Let’s take a look.

Conflict genesis

The brotherly inter-ethnic conflict morphed into an inter-ethnic EAO war pitting RCSS against the SSPP, TNLA and UWSA alliance after October 2015, when the former signed nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA) together with other seven EAOs, which the latter three have not taken part to ink.

Instead, the three, together with the other four EAOs opted to form a broader political alliance called the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC). The other four are the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) or Kokang, and National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) or Mongla.

Officially the FPNCC is said to be a political alliance, but the fact that the SSPP, TNLA, UWSA

combined forces to push back the RCSS indicates it is a military alliance, even if it is downplayed not to look like one.

The FPNCC made known its political aspirations of a confederacy solution informally in a paper to the then National League for Democracy (NLD)-led government during the NCA-based Union Peace Conference in July 2018, although it wasn't a full participant as it was only invited to attend the opening ceremony due to China, the delegation flying directly to Naypyitaw from Chinese territory.

Following the signing of the NCA, some hundreds of RCSS troops moved up north and armed clashes erupted in November 2015 in Namkham area with the TNLA. And since then, the two parties have been on a war-footing and clashing on and off for years.

The two Shan armies’ animosity started as the SSPP in July 2018 joined the TNLA in its war against the RCSS in Hsipaw Township, reportedly pushing it out from northern Shan State.

But in April 2019 the two Shan armies agreed to a ceasefire brokered by the Shan Sangha, political parties and the people. However, it lasted only a year and the clashes restarted again and have been going on unabated since then until today.

Unable to fend off the SSPP alliance attack, RCSS withdrew from the Namkham area close to the Chinese border a few months ago. But the alliance offensives continued in Kyaukme, Hispaw and Namtu townships against RCSS in the northern Shan State, without success.

During month-long clashes in July, the major battle for control of Loi Hon mountain range was brewing when the massive SSPP, TNLA and UWSA combined force numbering a few thousand, with heavy artillery, was poised to flush out the RCSS garrisons from the area. However, the RCSS withdrew all of its forces from the mountain range on July 8.

In its four-point statement, the RCSS said: “The combined SSPP/TNLA troops have been launching offensives against the RCSS in Namtu, Kyaukme and Hsipaw townships causing hardships for the local population; attempting to solve political problems through military will only lead to more difficulties and burden for the local people, and RCSS is only defending its positions; since the military coup in February the whole country has been in socio-economic hardships aside from having to coup with Covid-19 pandemic, and the inter-ethnic conflict would further exacerbate the people’s woes; and therefore, (we would) like to urge all those concerned involving in the armed conflicts in northern Shan State to find a peaceful solution to resolve the problems.”

Many thought that the SSPP alliance fight with the RCSS would now be limited only to northern Shan State. However, all of a sudden, the alliance started to attack the latter in Mong Kung Township in southern Shan State, making observers and analysts alike wonder if the move is more than just a territorial control war, as it seems more likely to be an aggressive proxy war to serve the bigger objective interests of China.

Mong Kung southward push

While the RCSS is fighting tooth and nail not to lose its operational areas in northern Shan State, like Kyaukme, Hsipaw and Namtu, as it already had to withdraw from Namkham area due to a massive offensive of the SSPP and its allies, the southward push to Mong Kung came as a surprise.

As of September 14, the SSPP alliance of some 400 troopers, in two-column formation, entered Loilem District, Mong Kung Township, Hokhe village tract and started the offensive, which to date has resulted in 3,000 displaced persons, Taifreedom News reports.

The fierce armed engagement occurred and about 1,000 local people from eleven villages took refuge at Nong Lyaw monastery, within Hokhe village tract.

The following day, a massive SSPP alliance force attacked the RCSS military outposts in Hokhe village tract, near Wan Mai.

At this writing, the battles are still raging in Hokhe village tract. Meanwhile, the armed conflict in northern Shan State, especially in Kyaukme Township, is continuing with no sign of stopping. About 4,000 displaced local citizens were said to be counted.

Recently, on September 25, SSPP and TNLA forces fired heavy artillery shells into the village of Hukwet, Kyaukme Township in its offensive against the RCSS. But its military camps are based in the east and north of the village some two miles away. The artillery shelling hit and destroyed a monastery and injured two monks and two locals, while it also burned down two houses, according to the Taifreedom News.

Reportedly, since the military coup on February 1, the SSPP and TNLA have been attacking the RCSS bases in northern Shan State. Fighting in Namtu and Hsipaw Townships has forced thousands of locals to flee their homes amid the coronavirus epidemic.

About 8,000 local people have been displaced by the recent armed conflict in Shan State. In northern Shan State more than 2,100 in Muse Township; about 1,000 in Hsipaw Township; more than 1,500 in Kyaukme Township; about 3,000 in Mong Kung Township in southern Shan State; with people fleeing to nearby towns and villages as refugees, according to the recent Kambawsa Tai News.

Ceasefire pleas

The Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) and Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP) have pleaded for the warring parties, especially the two Shan armies, to agree on a ceasefire without success.

The SNDP issued a statement urging the conflict parties to stop fighting as it is nothing to do with their political commitment but only for group survival and interest. Moreover, it said that they should let the people go on with their livelihood of agriculture production and business.

The SNLD General Secretary Sai Leik said the party has repeatedly urged the warring parties for months to stop fighting and negotiate but have not been successful.

“I would like to remark and also demand that during this period of harvesting, with all sorts of trouble and Covid-19 pandemic going on, including the convoluted political problems, the conflict between Shans should stop immediately,” said Sai Leik.

On September 22, Mong Kung Township Buddhist Charity Organization issued a statement to de-escalate the armed conflict between the RCSS and SSPP.

On September 24, in Mong Kung Township, Pangkyetu village displaced persons staged a demonstration using placards noting, "Stop the war" and "We want to go home to harvest our crops".

RCSS worries

The RCSS is on the defensive in northern Shan State and it is now having to defend its stomping ground in the south due to the SSPP alliance offensives. And even more so because the alliance troops, logistic movements are aided by the fact that the military junta is allowing the use of the motorways unhindered. In other words, the junta is tacitly aiding the SSPP alliance to cripple the RCSS. First in helping to drive out the RCSS from the north of Shan State and second, to block reinforcement of its troops in the north.

The RCSS has given up the Loi Hon mountain rage outposts in July, which is now rumoured to be manned by the UWSA, according to the local residents’ observation; and now the southward push is aimed to cripple the RCSS fighting ability if not to completely crush it.

During the first week of September feelers were said to be sent out by American friends of RCSS residing in Thailand and Burma, together with the Shan activists, to the USA-concerned authorities in letter form, in which it portrays the situation as being a “proxy war”.

The letter opens saying: “We are writing to you because we believe you want to help, that you can help, and perhaps most critical is that we need help.”

“Small nations like Burma, that are struggling to establish a federal democratic system such as yours, and especially states within these small nations such as our Shan State, look to the US not only as a model but also as purveyor and protector of the democratic system in the rest of the world,” the letter says.

The letter goes on to describe the sorts of models which Shan State would want to live in, emphasizing the importance that it is geographically located next to a large and powerful nation that has a goal of regional hegemony.

The models for the Shan State that the letter foresees are:

· “Big nations have friendly relations with one another, so small nations in between can live peacefully without being under suspicion from either side, which is, though most desirable, not happening yet.

· The next best thing is one big nation completely defeats another, so the small nation is freed from fear. In Burma’s case that is struggling to become a federal democracy like yours, it would be unthinkable to wish the United States as the vanquished. But the downside is that we still have to live alongside the big neighbour.

· The third model is the assurance by both big countries that these strings of small nations are kept strictly neutral and friendly to both. That, if there are elements inside getting support from one country, to assure that the other elements inside also receive support to defend themselves, while also pushing for peaceful dialogue between them. Or to see to it that neither element gets support from the big nations.“

As the letter notes: “What is happening in Shan State is contrary to this third model. China is supporting both the military dictatorship that rules the country and specific armed movements subservient to it (China). Meanwhile, the pro-federal democracy movements are only receiving token support from the `Free World´ which they have been looking forward to.”

In sum, the SSPP with its allies may be pushing south according to the directive from China, as they were also asked to evict RCSS from the northern Shan State and clear its presence from the area, where Chinese businesses need protection from reliable proxy armed groups. Reportedly, RCSS is considered “pro-West” for its dependency on Thailand to maintain its troops, when in fact it is not.

“(I)t became increasingly evident that the SSPP and its allies are fighting a proxy war for our giant neighbour. Also, to its dismay, the Tatmadaw, which was one of the key signatories of the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), was allowing military trucks transporting the non-signatory alliance troops and guns to the battlefield,” the letter writes.

“The prospects are that Chinese expansion enabled through the proxy SSPP/SSA coalition will have free reign should the RCSS withdraw from the north. The likelihood is that they, backed by their patron, are going to push further south to the Tenasserim (Taninthayi) peninsula. By that time, the whole juggernaut won’t be stopped until all territories west of the Irrawaddy are also taken. This will result in the United States and its major allies: Thailand and India being outflanked,” the letter warns.

“The only power that can prevent such a disaster is the United States,” the letter says and requests the following:

· That the United State seek increased dialogue with Beijing about respective peace activities in the region to avoid situations that could complicate an already difficult process;

· That the United States urged China to avoid any action or policies that obstruct or inhibit furtherance of peace inside Burma due to narrow consideration of its national interests;

· That the United States encourages China to develop a framework for responsible investments in Burma’s conflict areas that take into account the concerns of local communities and minimize the potential to fuel conflict;

· That the United States restores America’s standing in the region by strengthening federal democratic institutions in Burma;

· That the United States engages non-Burman groups like the RCSS/SSA and SSPP/SSA to move toward a peaceful resolution of their quarrels;

· That the United States supports and strengthens groups like RCSS/SSA to prevent counter-democratic forces to lay foundation inside Burma.

Meanwhile, on October 1, RCSS issued a six-point statement buttressing its allegation that the Burma Army is aiding the SSPP alliance to attack its forces.

In its second point, the statement says: “The worst incident has been the fact that the Tatmadaw has been encouraging the Ta'ang Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) by allowing their vehicles to use the main roads to transport their troops to launch offensives against the RCSS/SSA ceaselessly. The TNLA and the SSPP have chosen violent military means instead of peaceful negotiations to solve the problems. It is rather strange that while they could even talk to the enemy, yet they could not accept their fellow indigenous nationalities of Shan State for talks.”

Vested interests

Given the ongoing developments, it is fair to conclude that in Burma two types of conflict are moulding the political scenario. One is the popular uprising gripping the whole country in general and the other, a proxy war taking shape slowly but surely in Shan State, which may morph into something larger and more destabilizing.

Since our focus in this article is more concerned with the second one, the question arises as to whether the said proxy war is real or just imaginary.

On this score, the comments in May of a Yangon-based Chinese embassy official should be of concern. In a statement to an RCSS official, he said he was not wanting to see the RCSS in the northern Shan State as it is an anti-communist outfit stemming from Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA) originally, and the CPB (Communist Party of Burma) and still regarded SSPP as a pro-CPB good friend. In addition, the increased attacks of China's proxy EAOs on RCSS and even pushing further south into Mong Kung Township are factors supporting the argument that the inter-ethnic and inter-EAOs conflicts are a proxy war which is being waged to purposely serve the interests of China.

The Chinese embassy official said during the interview, according to Shan News report in June:

“So, when you say you are not an agent of the United States, and your forces in the north would protect the Chinese interests in northern Shan State, how can we believe in your words? If the SSPP can’t make you withdraw, we have other ways to make it happen.”

Beijing has its eye on its Belt Road Initiative (BRI) and China Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) infrastructure that stretch across Burma from southwest China to the Indian Ocean. The twin pipeline of gas and oil spans nearly 800 km running parallel from Kyaukphyu in Arakan or Rakhine State on the Bay of Bengal, through Magwe and Mandalay regions and northern Shan State before entering China in Kunming, is the project that worries China the most. So much so that it has asked the junta to provide extra security precautions as it worries the EAOs and National Unity Government's People's Defence Forces could damage it, according to a report by Tachilek News Agency on September 22.

Another concern is the building of seven dams along the Salween River, in which China, together with Thailand, are massively involved. Kun Long, Nong Pah, Mong Ton dams are under construction and are in Shan State; Ywa Thit (Karenni State), Wei Gyi (Karen State), Dagwin (Karen State) dams are planned or under an agreement; and Hatgyi dam under construction is in Karen State, according to The Third Pole report of June 8, 2021.

Washington distracted?

The crucial question though is whether the US and the West, in general, will take note of the proxy war or even accept that it exists, much less intervene and act accordingly.

The likelihood is that Washington will wait and see as, in the wake of its problematic withdrawal from Afghanistan, it still needs to reconsider how it will formulate its China containment policy.

The West’s approach to China and Asia as a whole is shifting. Australia, UK and the US have just set

up a trilateral security partnership called AUKUS aimed at confronting China, which will include helping Australia to build nuclear-powered submarines.

In the meantime, the joint statement of the QUAD leaders which include Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, on September 24 also writes: “We continue to call for the end to violence in Myanmar, the release of all political detainees, including foreigners, engagement in constructive dialogue, and for the early restoration of democracy. We further call for the urgent implementation of the ASEAN Five Point Consensus.”

“Nobody was willing to say the word ‘China’ out loud, but ‘containing’ China is just as much the focus of the QUAD as ‘containing’ the Soviet Union was when the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was founded 72 years ago. And like the NATO countries then, today's QUAD members collectively outnumber, outgun and surround their adversary,” writes Gwynne Dyer, an independent journalist, in a recent article in the Bangkok Post.

But how these international developments will affect the proxy war in Shan State and more generally in Burma is hard to predict, as pressing priority issues like the South China Sea, Taiwan, Xinjiang, Tibet still cannot be tackled.

Finally, while the Burma people's uprising or revolution is aimed at achieving the goal of uprooting the military junta and the establishment of a federal democratic union, the proxy war raging in Shan State may be intended solely to serve China's national interest, with a matching physical presence of its proxy EAOs to provide security for its business interests and trade and communication infrastructure linking southwest China to the Indian Ocean.

The SSPP alliance’s southward push is indeed a proxy war and appears to be a low-key probing of the US and West’s tolerance in allowing China to advance its national interests.

Whether the West will wake up and take notice, react and respond in kind is open to speculation.