Questions have been raised as to how the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAO) are responding to the six months of disruption prompted by the 1 February Military coup in Myanmar with an inkling of hope among the Bamar heartland that there might be a shift to back the people’s popular protest and revolution.
In addition, the situation is complicated by the COVID-19 pandemic that has negatively affected areas of the ethnic states.
In an unfortunate turn of events, the Bamar populated areas of Burma are now experiencing the type of Military brutality which has been the scourge of the ethnic areas for decades.
So, where do things stand in the ethnic states?
If we are to assess the conflict situation in the ethnic states over the last six months the situation remains largely the same, despite the Military coup. But there are some differences as to how each state is coping with the unfolding events.
Chin State
On May 29, Chin National Front (CNF), which has about 200 soldiers and never been engaged in armed conflict with the Myanmar Army or Tatmadaw but signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in October 2015, inked a collaboration pact with parallel National Unity Government (NUG) to resist dictatorship and establish a federal democracy.
According to the policy statement of July 9, Chinland Defence Force (CDF) was formed on April 4 with the aim of self-defence of their own area.
The four armed groups operating in Chin state and adjoining Sagaing areas are: CNF in Haka and Thantlang townships, Chin National Defence Force (CNDF) in Falam and Kale, Sagaing Region bordering Chin State in the north and west, townships, Zomi Revolutionary Organization (ZRO) in Tedim and Tonzang townships, and Chinland Defence Force (CDF) operating in Mindat, Kanpetlet and Matupi townships.
It is not clear if they synchronise operations or function under one central command.
Although the guerrilla-style clashes against the junta troops have been going on in Hakha, Mindat, Tedim, Kanpettlet and so on across the state, including taking out junta's informers and administrative personnel, Mindat PDF stands out prominently as it has ignited Chin patriotism and became the symbol of Chin people's resistance against the coup-makers.
According to a Myanmar Now report of July 1, the junta troops suffered heavy casualties at the hands of locals who are familiar with the state’s mountainous terrain and well-trained at shooting their hunting rifles.
“The current situation in Hakha is that the death toll from the military council’s side has risen to 56 since May 2,” the CDF spokesperson said. “And 215 members of the junta’s forces have been killed in the whole of Chin State.”
“On the CDF’s side, if the casualties in Falam are added, a total of 35 CDF members have been killed,” he said.
Kachin State
In Kachin State, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIA) has indicated its support for the people's uprising now dubbed the “Spring Revolution”, including the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM).
Following the military coup in February, the KIA made its position known to the junta that brutal crackdowns on the people's demonstrations would not be tolerated. But the junta's security forces did just that by shooting and killing the demonstrators who were against its rule. In return the KIA launched offensives to capture military bases and police stations in the Kachin State townships of Hpakant, Mogaung, Waingmaw, Putao and Tanai, as well as in northern Shan State. In Sagaing Region KIA operates together with the Sagaing PDF, which it helped train and arm.
It captured a dozen or so key military positions, such as Alaw Bum a strategic hilltop base near the border with China in Momauk Township located between Laiza and Mai Ja Yang, after days of fierce clashes.
The casualty figures both for the KIA and junta cannot be verified as no party made official announcements. But the estimated count may be in the hundreds.
Shan State
The EAO response to the nationwide people's uprising and CDM in Shan State is unlike the rest as it is more preoccupied with the inter-ethnic and inter-EAO conflicts rather than to support the popular trend of uprooting the military dictatorship, although some players gave moral support in their interviews with the media.
As such the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) and Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) have been battling each other since 2018 and lately the combined force of Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and SSPP have been attacking the RCSS positions in northern Shan State. Locals, who witnessed the recent armed conflict in Kehsi Township, Loi Hon mountain range said the TNLA and United Wa State Army (UWSA) might be fighting alongside the SSPP as they witnessed Wa and Palaung (Ta'ang) speaking soldiers among thousands of troops when they were trying to dislodge the RCSS. However, the RCSS gave up the outposts without defending them saying that it didn't want the people to suffer more in the midst of third wave of COVID-19 and its army is not formed to kill each other, who are all Shan.
The UWSA and National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) have not been involved in anti-junta activities. But Kokang, TNLA and KIA were involved in clashes with the junta forces on-and-off, although not the kind of offensives launched to capture the junta's military positions.
In Shan State there are several PDF groups formed both in northern and southern Shan State numbering some 15 but the one that made headlines is Shan State Front for Federal (SSFF) formed on July 7, which said it wanted to be a mediator between the two warring Shan armies. But largely they only exist on Facebook with no credible follow up action whatsoever to show that they are fighting the junta regime.
Karenni State
The Karenni or Kayah State local PDF forces have drawn in the reluctant Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) to confront the junta, which has not signed the NCA but was in the negotiation process with the previous civilian government when the Military made a coup on February 1.
However, the KNPP openly endorsed the people's uprising and the CDM. To date it has clashed several times with the junta's troops, aiding the local PDF and also when the junta forces intruded into its territories.
The Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) was formed on May 31 by combining the force of civilian fighters from across the Karenni territories, including Pekhon Township in southern Shan State and also the EAOs active in the areas.
According to a Myanmar Now report of July 6, the data compiled from the CDF and KNDF battle news,
clashes occurred between KNDF with the junta troops as of May 31 listed 176 junta troops killed, while the Karenni forces suffered 9 and 21 civilian deaths. The statistics were said to cover the whole of Kayah State, according to the KNDF and those involved in the armed clashes.
In June and July clashes with the junta were not as intense as in May, according to KNDF Facebook battle news. From June 5 to July 15 six major clashes were registered with minimum casualties on both sides. On June 15, KNDF declared a ceasefire but soon broke down because the majority didn't agree to it.
Karen State
Regarding the people's revolution the opinions within the Karen National Union/ Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA) are not uniform. Initially the KNU took a radical line condemning the coup in a statement signed by its Chairman Mutu Say Poe and even rejecting Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing’s overtures to meet, unless the junta rolled back its coup. But now he and his clique are open for negotiation with the junta. In contrast, the so-called hardliner group headed by Gen Baw Kyaw Heh who led the Brigade 5 of Hpapun is strictly against the coup and maintained that the military dictatorship must be abolished.
However, overall the KNU supported the anti-coup protesters and the CDM and have even been giving basic military training to the NUG headed PDF. But it is not clear if all those trained are under the NUG as many have already returned home to launch urban guerrilla-style resistance.
According to an Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) report titled, “Myanmar’s Spring Revolution” dated July 22, an illustration map shows the number of battles per township, which covers Karen and Mon states, including Bago and Tanintharyi regions, and has a scale from 1 to 22 gradually fading out from dark brown to white. Accordingly, the armed clash intensity could be categorized as the following.
The most intense highest clashes have been in Hpapun, followed serially by Thaton, Kyaukyi (Bago), Bilin (Mon State) and Kawkareik, Nyaunglebin, and Kyaikhto (Mon State).
On 27 March 2021, KNLA Brigade 5 overran a Myanmar Army base near the Thai border, killing 10 soldiers including a deputy battalion commander. The Myanmar Army launched multiple airstrikes on Karen villages in retaliation.
On 27 April 2021, the KNLA captured a Myanmar Army base along the Salween River, bordering Thailand's Mae Sam Laep sub-district.
According to Karen News, Lieutenant Colonel Saw Kler Doh said that from May until the end of June the KNLA had killed 284 and wounded 297 Burma Army soldiers.
Mon State
At this juncture, Mon State does not appear to be touched by the people's revolution in general.
The New Mon State Party (NMSP) position is clearly sympathetic to the CDM and people's uprising although it toes the line of mediation and reconciliation in what it sees as a conflict between the junta and National League for Democracy (NLD).
Thus, it is a far cry from Chin and Karenni states where PDF involvement is a dominant factor. In Mon State, NMSP doesn't accept such formations. Besides, the Mon Unity Party works with the junta, much to the chagrin of its party members, many of whom have tendered their resignation because of the cooperation.
Arakan State
The Arakan Army (AA) leadership at the beginning of the coup in February was silent and gave no comment until March 30 when it released a joint statement together with Kokang and TNLA. The statement sympathized with the people's uprising and demanded that the military stop its brutal crackdown or else they would have to side with the people. But nothing really happened in a true sense on the ground.
On March 11, the junta removed AA from their designated terrorist organization list and thus the unofficial ceasefire agreement which has been holding since November 2020 continues unabated. The junta seems also to be accommodating the AA administrative expansion, so much so that at the end of June it disarmed the more than 20 police officers staying at Mahamuni Buddha Temple in Kyauktaw. Reportedly, the AA has repeatedly warned against stationing junta forces at the temple.
On July 20, in an act to assert its administrative might the AA issued two directives. One was to counter the COVID-19 spread by issuing a “Stay at Home” order until August 4, and the other, a 24-point regulation on how to behave to combat the spreading of the pandemic.
Reportedly, AA directives were said to be largely followed, except for Sittway according to the locals.
According to indications and media reports the AA has consolidated much of its influence over the northern part of the state where most of the fighting has occurred over the past few years
In short, the Arakan State front will have no war so long as the AA desire to be like the UWSA Self-Administered Zone is not disrupted by the junta. Consequently, the CDM and Spring Revolution actions will be largely muted in the state, as the AA is now portrayed in the conflict as competing between the junta and NLD, the fight among Bamar political forces for supremacy.
COVID-19 Pandemic
Concerning management of COVID-19 vaccination and prevention in ethnic states, the Ethnic Health Committee (EHC) issued an eight-point statement on May 6.
The main messages of the statement were that it has undertaken self-help prevention for the people in the ethnic states.
International aid channelled through central Burma to the EHOs was unable to reach its destination due to ongoing fighting with the Burma Army. Following the coup, thousands of staff from the Ministry of Health and Sports (MOHS) went on strike to lead the CDM. Many of these health workers who fled to ethnic areas are continuing to provide health care in ethnic areas.
What is clear is the collapse of Burma's health system, including the striking by the CDM, combined with the human rights crisis have led to greater shortages of material and financial support in order to assist these newly displaced peoples in ethnic areas.
The statement called for increased international support directly to the EHOs who bear responsibility for the growing displaced populations in their areas, and asked for support of PPE, COVID-19 testing machines and COVID-19 vaccines, upgrading health infrastructures which EHOs already have the capability to deliver.
It further requested India, Bangladesh, China and Thailand to allow much needed COVID-19 vaccines into EHO controlled areas as a humanitarian gesture and as well as to protect their own populations from the pandemic.
So far, the SSPP and KIA have been given tens of thousands of vaccines by China to cope with the pandemic but still need a lot more to be effective. The TNLA said it was promised vaccines by China but haven't received them yet. MNDAA didn't talk about its situation but NDAA and UWSA areas were said to be fully vaccinated with Chinese-made vaccines. RCSS said that it is still looking for vaccines. AA hasn't said anything about a vaccination drive so far.
Six months into this post-coup crisis, those in charge of the ethnic regions are faced with a complicated challenge: dealing with a seemingly expanding pandemic and dealing with the ongoing brutality of the Military junta.
