The ongoing crisis in Myanmar presents a unique opportunity for charting the country’s future. It is empowering local actors operating beyond the reach of the junta, laying the building blocks for an emergent federalist state. And the need to address climate change is one feature of this transformative process.
This, in a nutshell, is the central argument laid out by writer and consultant Ashley South in “Conflict, Complexity, and Climate Change: Emergent Federal Systems and Resilience in Post-coup Myanmar” (henceforth referred to as Conflict and Climate Change).
The book was published by the Regional Center for Social Science and Sustainable Development (RCSD), Chiang Mai in August 2023.
South employs climate change as a lens through which to view both the failures of the state and a means to explore new political structures.
“Since the military takeover,” writes South, “the challenge is to rebuild Myanmar through a new federating process, including important new (or emergent) stakeholders.” These stakeholders are predominantly identified as EAOs and CSOs. And the key to identifying what local actors should be supported – both domestically and internationally – lies in assessing which have implemented successful adaptations in the absence of central authority and in meeting local needs.
However, some local needs are directly linked to international needs. Nowhere is this arguably more apparent than in the area of climate change. Forest conservation and reforestation are central to protecting biodiversity and drawing down carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. And in Myanmar, much of this forested land lies in regions held by EAOs. Referencing the significance of this relationship, Conflict and Climate Change assesses “For the first time in history, ethnic actors in Myanmar have globally important roles to play.”
Myanmar’s forests are a linchpin in the fight to limit future temperature changes both regionally and globally. But for years this resource has been abused and exploited. With a deforestation rate of 1% to 2.5% from 2000 to 2020, Myanmar ranked as one of the top ten countries globally for deforestation. But
now, some local actors are taking a lead in reversing this trend, including ethnic groups that have banned logging in their areas of control.
In South’s estimation, “If Myanmar’s EAOs can position themselves as protectors of the forest, they can move away from negative associations of EAOs as primarily interested in income generation through resource extraction…In this way, EAOs can move along the spectrum from warlords toward responsible local governance actors.” It then follows that these local actors have earned the support of international donors and aid agencies, who need to “adopt more conflict-sensitive approaches, including principled engagement with the country’s diverse EAOs.”
Not to mention that this relationship between EAOs and the international community, as mapped out in Conflict and Climate Change, can serve to help define new funding models for EAOs, via payments from the international community for green public services provided by EAOs for the betterment of all humanity. It is such a symbiotic relationship revolving around the subject of climate change that is at the heart of South’s broader narrative.
And this broader narrative is one of chronicling the rise of EAOs, and to a lesser extent CSOs, in leading the realization of a federal, democratic Myanmar. “Local EAO, state-level, and People’s Defense Force (PDF) governance-administration and security structures in post-coup Myanmar can be seen as the adaptive, self-organizing building blocks of emerging federal structures,” argues South.
Conflict and Climate Change proceeds to speculate that “Joint EAO-CSO-community action on climate initiatives can be an entry point for enhancing resilience, and developing effective local governance and long-term peace building (with inclusive arrangements to address the potential marginalization of “minorities within minorities”).”
Though there is a cautionary tale contained within the narrative, a type of survival of the fittest, of which we may already be seeing the beginnings. As may be naturally predisposed, the more successful groups in administering their areas and in meeting the needs of the people (and environment) can be assumed to receive the most support. And when it comes time to define and direct the “higher (union)-level emergent functions and discussions” these groups will have greater influence. It is a question for any federalist structure, how to balance equal but unequal components.
While climate change forms a foundation for the text’s overarching narrative, we must not neglect the Complexity that also features prominently throughout the text. One example of this is the need to address education if federalism is to thrive. As South writes, “Education must cease to be a driver of conflict, and instead must be a federating process in education.” If a federalist approach to education is not well designed, explained, and implemented with honest intent, it can be abused to challenge the foundations of diversity within the state and undermine the federalist experiment. We have seen many such instances, such as with Sri Lanka, where educational policy and/or implementation stoked the fires of ethnic conflict.
But the complexity does not stop with education. As we look to a future federal Myanmar, Conflict and Climate Change argues that the components of the federalist state need be regarded “as autonomous, and in effect sovereign.” This serves as another example of the complexity involved in charting the path forward for Myanmar federalism. For this autonomy/sovereignty must simultaneously accept diversity as a strength within a new national/common identify. It becomes essential, for example, to avoid the pitfalls of the previous peace process that merely entrenched the concept of a state defined by fixed ethnic groups.
Many would agree that the world is in need of a radical agenda to address climate change. And many would also agree that Myanmar is need of a radical agenda to address the country’s future. To what degree, then, can these two agendas come together? Conflict and Climate Change provides a well-resourced, visionary blueprint for “building back better” in Myanmar – that goes well beyond climate change – arguing that there is “an urgent need to develop narratives and programs to support federalism from below in the context of resilient climate change action in Myanmar.”
Ultimately, a peoples ’response to issues challenging their livelihood and way of life will depend on their political, economic, and social institutions and on their cultural values. Decisions will be made to prioritize survival. And within this milieu rationality cannot be assumed to be singularly defined. People will calculate their own best interests based on an assessment of the circumstances in which they exist. And their decisions may rest on a complicated combination of factors.
As with so many things, these decisions are largely contingent upon leadership – both at the local level and further afield. We can only hope that such leadership shares a similar vision to Conflict and Climate Change when it comes to preserving the world’s resources and the integrity of the Myanmar state.
Conflict, Complexity, and Climate Change can be downloaded at no cost here: https://rcsd.soc.cmu.ac.th/publications/conflict-complexity-climate-change/
