There are grounds to believe that current political conditions favor the democratic goals of the people of Myanmar. A primary factor is the limited experience and management skills of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing—the leader of the junta’s violent and corrupt regime. Unlike his predecessors, U Ne Win (1962-1988) and U Than Shwe (1992-2011), Min Aung Hlaing has seasoned neither discernment nor distinctions of grandeur and glory. Even within the military itself, there is no confidence in him.
In an interview with Phoenix Television, a Hong Kong-based, partially Chinese-state-owned network, Min Aung Hlaing acknowledged in late May that his military (the Tatmadaw) still did not have complete control of the country, and that there was much greater opposition to the military takeover than he had expected. Such an admission reveals a lack of confidence in his own ability to understand the desires of Myanmar people and the current situation.
Victory, even rapid victory, is achievable in political and military battles when strong leadership capitalizes on moments of enemy weakness. Below, I outline observations on where leaders of the Spring Revolution can work more effectively to defeat the military regime.
(1) Burman politicians must exercise greater political maturity and generosity to achieve collective leadership
A quick triumph in the Spring Revolution can only materialize through united leaders forming a coalition of political actors representing ethnic people, and the wider public on an equal-footing. This will require the current leaders of the National League for Democracy (NLD), who are taking refuge in ethnic controlled areas, to become more politically mature and generous in discussions with the ethnic leaders. The phrase, ‘Karen One Kyat; Burman One Kyat’ expressed by the Karen in their first demonstrations for equal rights in 1947 emphasizes equal partnership and carries political significance. We need this political generosity today, and the implementation of specific policies and actions in support of it. From this political generosity, those ethnic groups that weren’t part of the original post-independence negotiations may join forces to realize the “Second Panglong” sought by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
The question then becomes how to develop political maturity, and generosity. Bamar politicians should share more top leadership positions with representatives of ethnic groups in their coalition against the military junta’s State Administration Council (SAC). This means true power-sharing: For example, if eight votes are allocated at a hypothetical summit, the major political decision makers of the eight regions, including the NLD, should get one vote each. The ethnic leaders will be able such political maturity and generosity of the Burmans in the spring revolution would enable ethnic leaders to clearly differentiate between “prodemocracy Burmans” and “those Burmans” who have joined forces with SAC, the common enemy.
As leading NLD members of the National Unity Government (NUG) gain political maturity and generosity, important aspects of strategy development, such as intent, and capability will naturally follow. They will complement these grand strategies with time management. Otherwise; the revolution will lengthen with political frugality, and immaturity among NLD leaders in the NUG. As time goes on, the SAC will regain strength and get the upper hand.
(2) Political leaders shouldn’t seek support only from Western countries; they must engage more with neighbouring governments and civil society in the region. Similarly, they must pay more attention to domestic voices by spending more time interacting with ethnic groups.
As a friend on the frontline described the situation metaphorically to me - Burmese people grow up eating rice with steamed Burmese chickpeas, though eating pizza and pasta might fill us temporarily, we can never get used to them and we won’t want to have them every day.
Since the February 1 coup, I have observed Zoom meetings of the opposition’s top political leadership—the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) and NUG—jam packed with Western diplomats and experts. Western countries and organizations support the NUG and thus are easier to reach out to. But, isn’t politics all about making the impossible possible? The CRPH and NUG must break free from their psychological comfort zone. Though challenging, the NUG cannot ignore the important role that regional Asian neighbours play in Myanmar. NUG must accelerate engagement with governments and civil society organizations from neighbouring countries in order to convince them to pledge support.
In practice, the military regime may only be completely defeated if Myanmar’s neighbouring countries align with the Spring Revolution and alter the balance of power. We must accept this bitter reality. Power dynamics between our regional neighbors such as China, SEA countries plus Japan, India, including economic investments and other points of leverage, must be well understood. The NUG must be practical and willing to make deals. Criticizing these countries for what they lack or cannot do is an exercise in time wasting which we cannot actually afford. For example, NUG can provide guarantees to the Chinese government that their economic and business interests will be safe. Even if China never publicly supports the Spring Revolution, the NUG can deter them from supporting the SAC.
Within Myanmar, there has been insufficient communication between Burmans and other ethnic groups on the Rohingya issue. With pressure from the West, policy statements on various issues were made with insufficient consultation on local interests. As a consequence, efforts to address the Rohingya issue were not as strong as they could have been because they did not garner enough support from certain ethnic groups. There were many discussions with the West but not enough among the Myanmar people in order to effectively move forward with the issue.
As discussed in Part (1), the NUG needs to form a consensus on policy issues with ethnic leaders at top political summits to solidify its position.
As the Spring Revolution reaches its six-month mark, many official documents and communications are available only in English. For example, the “About” and “Objectives” sections of the NUG and CRPH Facebook’s pages are still written in English, even though over 22 million Facebook users from Myanmar can only read Burmese. The Spring Revolution should prioritize informing the people of Myanmar—and trying to reach their hearts. Myanmar people must be able to perceive the goals of the NUG in order to stay committed to the Revolution.
In summary, the current political situation must be analyzed from an angle that is pragmatic, inclusive, and constructive.
Since the February coup, Myanmar is facing a national political uprising; the entire nation is engaging in politics as led by leaders of Generation Z and the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). The Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), based on its election mandate, formed the NUG to manage this political momentum. What ways forward are there to sustain this revolutionary spirit and momentum? My analysis goes back to the pre-independence generation in Myanmar, and talk of political generosity and making political dealings at Panglong that General Aung San, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s father who led and managed the independence movement for Myanmar from British rule. Perhaps the NUG leadership can follow in his footsteps.
