Inside Myanmar’s NUG and the Spring Revolution

Inside Myanmar’s NUG and the Spring Revolution

Mizzima

As the National Unity Government (NUG) marks the second anniversary of its founding, the Nyan Lin Thit Analytica group has published a report entitled “Two Year Activities of the CRPH, NUCC and NUG” covering developments since the 1 February 2021 military coup up until January 2023.

The report was released in April 2023. In addition, the group has released a report on the Myanmar junta during this same period. The publications come out as the NUG marks its second anniversary of its founding on 16 April 2023.

The main report is written using both quantitative and qualitative research approaches with the data retrieved from the ministries of CRPH, NUCC, NUG, social media news and websites, noting that there may be some gaps in reporting.

The following is an assessment of the report and also editorial commentary provided in an attempt to put the developments into context.

LEADING THE REVOLUTION

After the military took power in the coup in 2021, Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) and National Unity Government (NUG) have been in part leading the revolution and within the two years of the revolution, they have been striving mainly towards ending the military dictatorship and building a federal union, the report says.

In the wake of the Myanmar coup and the arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint and other members of the government elected in 2020, the CRPH, NUCC and NUG were established in 2021 to implement the people’s purpose of ending the dictatorship and building a federal democratic union.

The CRPH and NUCC were formed first before the NUG, viewed by many Spring Revolution supporters as representing the Myanmar people – labelled in the media as the shadow government or opposition, but in effect standing as the civilian government of Myanmar.

Initially, after many meetings and consultations, the NUCC laid out a road map to return power to the people.

The CRPH, NUCC and NUG operate under the banner of the Spring Revolution and have their roles, though they do not represent all People’s Defence Forces (PDF) or Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (ERO) who are fighting in the field. 

NEW APPROACH

What became clear in the early months of the Spring Revolution was the remnants of the National League for Democracy-led government under the CRPH, NUCC and NUG needed to adjust their approach to a number of challenges the previous government administration, under Aung San Suu Kyi, had faced in terms of dealings with the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAO) and the Rakhine and Rohingya situation.

In order to form a new national government, discussions were made within NUCC and with the confirmation by the CRPH, which led to the formation of the NUG on 16 April 2021. The NUG is responsible for the implementation of the political roadmap and for the administrative mechanism. The NUG stated that Regional and State governments have also formed and that they are working towards all-inclusiveness.

One of the first steps was the CRPH offered an olive branch to the EAOs. They announced all EAOs are no longer rebels and terrorists on March 17, 2021, the aim being to co-opt them in order to eradicate the military dictatorship and set up a federal union. Within these two years, CRPH and NUG have been meeting and discussing with EROs, revolutionaries and stakeholders.

ROHINGYA U-TURN?

Regarding Rohingya matters, the NUG announced on 3 June, 2021 that it would work towards the good of all residents in Rakhine by meeting with all Rohingya organizations, representatives from IDP camps, and stakeholders from Rakhine. Additionally, the NUG announced that it would change or adjust the contentious 1982 Citizenship Law and that it would include all perspectives from the citizens including those residing in Rakhine.

Moreover, in February 2022, NUG withdrew all genocide-related objections raised by the NLD government to the International Court of Justice's charges against Myanmar, charges brought in the wake of the Myanmar military offensive in 2017 that drove over 700,000 Rohingya in Rakhine State to flee to Bangladesh.

Kyaw Zaw, the spokesperson of the NUG presidential office and NUG Women, Youth and Children Affairs Minister Naw Susanna Hla Soe, apologized publicly through their respective social networks for not standing up for ethnic peoples and Rohingya whose human rights were violated under the NLD government that held office for five years after the won the 2015 elections.

COMMON ENEMY

These moves were important both for the Rohingya community but also in terms of international diplomacy. The NUG outreach to the Rohingya and related NGOs recognized that they now had a common enemy – the military junta. 

On 20 June, 2021, NUG and the Rohingya representatives from the Muslim of Myanmar Multi-Ethnic Consultative Committee met for the first time and discussed Rohingya matters.

In 2022, NUG held three meetings with Rohingya organizations, education leaders and the people, regarding the resettlement of Rohingya, protecting them according to the laws, and for the regaining of long-lost educational opportunities.

BUILDING A GOVERNMENT

What is clear from the developments over the last couple of years is that the NUG, CRPH and NUCC are working to form a government for Myanmar to run operations in-country and to deal with the international community, including efforts to be recognized at the United Nations and in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) forum – and to stymie incidents of the Myanmar junta or Military Council being invited to international events, as has happened on a number of occasions. 

The NUG is made up of 17 Ministries and under these respective Ministries, the following Union Ministers and Vice Ministers are operating.

After developing the NUG, the first NUG government meeting was held on 17 April 2021 and up to 7 February 2023, there have been five Government Meetings, according to the report. In those meetings, political, administrative, international recognition related matters were discussed and in the two years anniversary of the revolution meeting, it was specifically stated that they need to speed up their drive in order to avoid them having to mark their three year anniversary of the revolution and that “now is the best time to build trust with the people which deteriorated due to the dictatorship and chauvinism.”

The NUCC held its first press and media conference on 16 November, 2021 and discussed the building of a federal union. The first People’s Assembly was led by the NUCC on 27 January 2022 and the Federal Democracy Charter was approved.

The NUG has built up infrastructure to support labour, education, health and other elements of a government administration. This includes support for people who joined the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) made up of people who resigned their jobs or official positions in government-related organizations. This includes soldiers and police officials who defected. 

Since the coup, there has been no official contact between the NUG, NUCC and CRPH – the Spring Revolution players - and the Military Council.

INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH

Dr. Sasa and the UN Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun led the efforts to get recognition of CRPH, NUCC and NUG as official government organizations from the time of the coup until today and lately it can be seen that Minister of International Relations Zin Mar Aung has been taking the lead in international matters.

When Zin Mar Aung went to RFA Head office for exclusive interview, the US government provided her full security throughout the whole trip. Zin Mar Aung also held meetings with parliament representatives from European countries such as Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greek, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, Britain and Australia. Moreover, Daw Zin Mar Aung had unofficial meetings with ambassadors from South Korea and Japan and also met with the Malaysian Foreign Minister.

But international outreach has not been plain sailing. 

Although the NUG Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung was invited to deliver a video speech at the UN’s Global Town Hall 2022 on 5 November 2022 under the title “Sustaining Peace and Development in a Divided World”, one UN official restricted her from delivering her speech. Moreover, Deputy Foreign Minister Moe Zaw Oo was also sent to the “breakout room” of Zoom when it was his turn to speak. Regarding this situation, although the UN does not support the Military Council, it also does not want to publicly show support towards the CRPH and the NUG and therefore, restricted the participation of NUG representatives, the report says. 

The report noted that the UN needs to take more effective action regarding Myanmar’s situation.

UN ACTION

There have been some hopeful signs. On 21 December 2022, the United Nations Security Council called for an immediate end to all violence across Myanmar, and issued an order to the Myanmar Military Council to release all political prisoners, including President Win Myint and Aung San Suu Kyi. In addition, they called for dialogue and the implementation of the ASEAN Five-point Consensus.

The NUG, particularly through the office of the NUG Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung, have been reaching out to engage with the relevant UN offices and officials in attempts to put the Myanmar crisis on the UN agenda.  

Questions have been raised over the UN Special Envoy Ms Noeleen Heyzer and her interactions with the Myanmar opposition and the NUG. Ms Heyzer claimed in March 2023 that she has held unofficial meetings with representatives of the NUG, when queried by the media on this, and said she was planning to meet NUG Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung, though it is unclear whether this meeting has taken place so far. 

BURMA ACT

The NUG saw a win with the US government administration. On 10 May 2021, the BURMA Act (Burma Unified through Rigorous Military Accountability Act of 2021 or the BURMA Act of 2021) was submitted to the US Congress to impose sanctions on all those related to the Military Council and those who violate human rights against the people of Myanmar, whether it is an individual or the organization as a whole. On 23 December, 2022, US President Joe Biden signed the National Defense Authorization Act-NDAA which included the Burma Act and therefore started non-lethal aid towards Myanmar. This aid will be received from 2023 to 2027 and therefore, America is initiating its support to help the CRPH, NUCC, NUG, including the EROs. 

ASEAN FAILURE

Closer to home it is clear that two years of debating the Myanmar crisis by ASEAN has resulted in failure to date. 

As the report notes, the Military Council did not follow the Five-point Consensus of ASEAN, and ASEAN rejected the Military Council in the ASEAN meetings and showed its disapproval for the Military Council. However, Thailand, Brunei, Cambodia, Singapore and Vietnam are still having political and economic relationships with the Military Council and have not yet recognized the NUG as the official representative of Myanmar.

On the other hand, the Malaysian Foreign Minister met with representatives of the NUG before the UN General Assembly meeting in 2022. Malaysia is the first country to have this kind of official relationship with the NUG among ASEAN members. Before that meeting, the Malaysian Foreign Minister also met unofficially with the NUG Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung in May 2022. Malaysia is a country that opposed the military coup and its meetings with NUG minsters can be seen as a way of showing solidarity with the people of Myanmar.

The NUG also requested ASEAN not to allow the Military Council to attend ASEAN meetings. On 9 November 2022, the NUCC sent a letter to ASEAN which called on the forum not to recognize the elections planned by the Myanmar Military Council, and to liaise with the CRPH, NUCC and NUG as legitimate representatives of the Myanmar people.

Indonesia, ASEAN chair for 2023, announced in January 2023 that it will open a special office to handle Myanmar affairs. This step can be seen as an improvement in the ASEAN sector by imposing more pressure on the Military Council. Therefore, there is hope that Indonesia will have more success to mediate compared with the failed efforts of Brunei and Cambodia as ASEAN Chairs in 2021 and 2022 respectively.

On the other hand, there is hope that NUG representatives may be able to officially attend ASEAN meetings, the report says.

CHINA CARD

The Chinese government has proved an important supporter of the Myanmar Military Council in terms of diplomatic support and in pursuit of Beijing’s development and investment projects in Myanmar, including the strategic China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), mining projects, and the stalled Myitsone Dam project.

The report says that on 7 June 2021, the NUG sent an open letter to China's Foreign Minister Mr. Wang Yi. However, China has yet to publicly respond to the NUG regarding the Myanmar issue, and is stronger in its cooperation with the Military Council. Whether or not China has privately engaged with the NUG is unclear.

JAPAN CONUNDRUM

In relation with Japan, there were meetings with the NUG Union Ministers and Japan Parliament representatives with the aim to recognize the NUG as legitimate and to stop Japan’s development aid from going to the military junta. However, Japan has not yet taken any action.

Mr. Sasakawa, Japan's Special Representative for Peace in Myanmar, visited Myanmar in November 2021 for a five-day visit. He tried to meet Aung San Suu Kyi and members of the NLD, but was not allowed, so he only met with the members of the Military Council and some political parties. Moreover, he mediated between the Military Council and the Arakan Army (AA) for a ceasefire agreement.

Critics have voiced concern over Japan’s humanitarian aid delivery, similar to worries expressed about the UN and other international organizations, the fear being noted over the danger of funneling aid through the Military Council. 

Among the demands of the NUG and CRPH are that there should be sanctions on businesses related to the military community, the withdrawal of the Military Council from the international community and the provision of humanitarian aid directly to the people in need in Myanmar.

FIGHTING FRONT

In the wake of the 1 February 2021 coup, the militant fight back by the Spring Revolution players appears to have sprung up spontaneously after weeks of protests on the streets. 

According to the report, the People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) were first established on 5 May 2021 by the NUG. 

What appears to have happened is the NUG embraced the independent efforts of groups of young men, and some women, in forming resistance groups, some directly controlled by the NUG, but the majority pledging loyalty to the NUG but largely operating independently.

According to the report, PDFs are the armed forces which emerged after the military coup and are made up of three parts. They are the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), Local Defense Forces (LDFs) and Local Defense Teams (LDTs).

PDFs are armed forces functioning in region and states while LDFs and PDTs are local and village security revolutionary armed groups. PDFs function under NUG and ERO under Centralized Military Command Structure (C3C) and Joint Command and Coordination (J2C). However, Chinland Defense Forces (CDF), Karenni Nationalities Defense Forces (KNDF) and Kachin People’s Defense Forces (KPDF) are functioning under C3C but are not under the control of NUG. They are armed forces that already have their own administrative mechanisms and chain of commands.

Although the people have been resisting the Military Council oppression for seven months in a peaceful way, when the time came to resist with a defensive war, NUG Interim President Duwa Lashi la announced the Right to Defense starting from 7 September 2021.

From that time forward, armed revolutionary groups emerged all throughout the country and some are fighting in alliance with eight EROs to overthrow the Military Council. Moreover, in 2022, Burma People Liberation Army (BPLA) and Magway based People’s Revolution Army PRA-Magway met with NUG-Ministry of Defense and are said to be working in alliance in military matters.

According to the report, NUG leaders and NUG-Minister of Defense visited the frontline posts and revolutionary forces’ graduation ceremonies personally and took care of their living conditions. The NUG Ministry of Defense has also allied with the people to provide some levels of food supply and weapons and ammunition. 

In terms of weapons distribution, the NUG Minister of Information and Technology Htin Lin Aung stated that they now have anti-aircraft weapons which can take down Military Council aircraft. This has yet to be confirmed.

Over the last two years, weapons and ammunition supply has proved a dire challenge for many PDF groups, many forced to make their own guns, mortars and makeshift missile launchers. Suitable weaponry and ammunition remain a challenge. There are little or no weapons being delivered from outside Myanmar. 

The NUG Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration has enacted the People’s Police law and formed township police forces in PDF controlled areas to take action over crimes and to provide security for the citizens.

Respective NUG departments have collaborated with PDFs, LDFs, LDTs, LAFs and helped to provide humanitarian aid and financing on the ground. NUG-Ministry of Defence has also formed alliances with the PDFs and EROs as they carry out what is termed a “defensive war” against the Military Council. 

In addition, the CRPH, NUCC, NUG claim to have had some success through lobbying to cut off oil companies, which are the main sources of the Military Council’s income, as well as increasing efforts to prosecute the war crimes committed by the Military Council and to increase the interim administration programmes on the ground in the country.

After one year of the defensive war, the NUG announced at the end of 2022 that “2023 will be the year to end the revolution” and that they already have control in 50 percent of the country. This claim of control has yet to be verified.

NUG ADMINISTRATION

The report says that more than a year after the coup, the PDFs led by the NUG in Sagaing and Magway, and the allied EROs began to take control and interim public administration groups were formed in 29 townships in Sagaing and seven townships in Magway with administrative staff who left their former jobs.

Local Administrative Forces (LAFs) are unarmed groups who are taking care of administrative mechanisms in areas where NUG’s interim administration mechanisms are in action. When UN organizations came to supply humanitarian aid, local defense forces and local administration forces are guaranteed to provide security protection. People’s Defense Teams (PDTs) are armed groups responsible for local security in areas where interim people’s administration mechanisms are operating. PDTs are protecting and defending against oppression of civilians by the Military Council members, such as rape, robbery and burglary.

In some ethnic areas, they already have their own administration mechanism long before the CRPH, NUCC or NUG existed. Disputes have occurred. On 26 April 2022, Karenni State Government, Ministry of Home Affairs announced that it objected to the Demoso Local Administration Forces’ formation of interim village and township administration departments and the NUG’s reformation of the CDM administration committee into a local administration department.

According to the report, concerns have been voiced by ethnic administrations about some attempts by the NUG and its related bodies to impose local administrations, with the concern this may represent a Burmanization or imposition of Bamar hegemony that has been a challenge in Burma for decades. 

WAY FORWARD

From the day of the coup to this day, the NUG, NUCC and CRPH are working together to remove the illegal military junta and install a legitimate government, according to the report.

Over the least two years, international relations and cooperation stands as the most progressive sector. CRPH, NUCC, NUG has received support and recognitions from the USA, Europe, South Korea and Japan but Russia, China and India have shown no sign of a willingness to recognize the NUG as legitimate.

On the ground, the NUG needs to reach out to all Spring Revolution players to engage meaningfully in dialogue over a joint vision of a democratic federal union and what this would look like in the flesh. 

The full report can be found here: https://bit.ly/3zOUE1Y