Dressed in flip-flops, t-shirts and longyi or shorts, many of Myanmar’s Spring Revolution resistance fighters may look rag-tag, yet they pack a punch, committed to live or die fighting.

As the second anniversary of the Myanmar generals’ fateful 2021 coup looms, fighters under the labels People’s Defence Forces (PDF) or Local Defence Forces (LDF) are battling the junta or State Administration Council (SAC) in Bamar-dominated regions as they build up their military clout and staying power. At the same time, Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAO) have seen a significant uptick in military clashes with the Myanmar military - or, conversely, some groups are sitting on the fence, pacified for now by junta-initiated “peace deals”.

Taking stock of developments over the last 12 months, Myanmar’s bloody civil war is clearly intensifying with the combatants on both sides digging in – the junta now arguably on the backfoot in a number of areas and over-stretched country-wide. Although junta troops have been using bloody “scorched earth” tactics to crack down on hundreds of villages in Myanmar’s heartland, the “hit-and-run” guerrilla tactics of the PDFs and LDFs are increasingly taking their toll against the military, prompting changes in junta tactics as the soldier body-count rises.

Such is the horror of the junta’s brutal tactics of torture, killing and rape – some incidents caught on video – they have prompted international outcry.

Aware they have a PR problem, the junta is pushing for a tightly-controlled national election in August 2023 that the generals hope will provide a fig-leaf of legitimacy on the international stage – despite the dismissal of the poll by the resistance.

This junta plan has prompted a sense of urgency amongst the ranks of the National Unity Government (NUG), a body that has been finding its feet with some level of coordination with the PDFs and LDFs, increased funding, and a growing profile internationally – with UN Myanmar representative Kyaw Moe Tun recently bagging a continuation of his “stand-in” position on the international stage.

As the UN Security Council voted on Wednesday last week for an immediate end to violence in Myanmar and call on the junta to release all political prisoners - including the 77-year-old ousted leader Aung San Suu Kyi who effectively faces life in jail – the pressure on the myriad resistance groups to press for “victory” is growing shriller.

Yet the window between now and August 2023 poses a challenge. Security analysts warn there is a yawning gap between the fighting capabilities of the lightly armed Spring Revolution resistance and the heavily armed Myanmar junta forces – and that a PDF-EAO alliance is ever more crucial if there is ever to be a chance of real progress on the battlefield.

YEAR OVERVIEW

Looking back, 2022 proved that the Spring Revolution resistance born post-coup was not a flash in the pan. On the contrary, the actions of this movement in its second year demonstrated increased action, competence and resolve to end oppressive military rule.

Appearances can at times appear to be deceptive. The PDF groups with a myriad names that cropped up initially in 2021 appeared poorly armed in the face of the junta artillery, tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and fighter jets and helicopters. But entering 2022, and as the months ticked by, the PDFs displayed staying power and hit-and-run ability leading to a rash of casualties on the part of the junta forces.

True, many PDFs are poorly armed, some relying on home-made weaponry. But over time, supplies of factory-grade or imported weapons gradually improved, in addition to captured weapons. Even drones were used to bomb junta positions.

BAMAR HEARTLAND

A shocker for the junta has arguably been the clashes they have had in what used to be their prime army recruiting ground. The Bamar-dominated regions, Anyar, also known as the Dry Zone, which includes Sagaing, Magway and Mandalay are the epicentre and hot beds of the new resistance movement, delivering fierce armed engagement to the junta. The rest, Ayeyarwady, Bago, Yangon and Tanintharyi regions, have sizeable resistance but less intensive armed conflict with the junta in comparison to the Anyar area.

The resistance movements in Anyar that started shortly after the February 2021 military coup by the military junta created a widespread armed resistance and political disobedience by the people that continued through 2022. The junta in turn responded with scorched earth, roving offensives deploying numerous troops supported by artillery, armoured vehicles and airstrikes to systematically flush out the resistance forces of PDFs, under the NUG, and other numerous LDFs some affiliated to the NUG and some operating independently.

These actions have prompted hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee their homes, ratcheting up the humanitarian crisis.

Security analysts are watching carefully.

“Besides the Tatmadaw (junta's troops), the key conflict actors in the Dry Zone are SAC-allied Pyusawhti militia and anti-SAC PDFs, both of which comprise Bamar-Buddhist civilians without prior combat experience. EAOs are not significant actors here. The forces are unevenly matched: while the Tatmadaw reinforces the Pyusawhti with heavy weaponry, armoured vehicles, and aircraft, the PDFs fight with improvised explosives, makeshift weapons, and small arms. Yet a decisive victory for the regime is not in sight; instead the Dry Zone is experiencing a painful war of attrition. At present, PDFs are making minor gains – successfully ambushing Tatmadaw columns, upgrading their weaponry, and growing increasingly organised – even as the SAC sets fire to communities suspected of supporting PDFs. For both PDF and Pyusawhti members, the fight is existential. The Dry Zone also illustrates how the coup has destabilised day-to-day social relations, with communities polarised along the lines of the conflict, creating a patchwork of pro-SAC and anti-SAC villages,” according to “Post-coup Myanmar in six warscapes” – 10 June 2022, published by The International Institute for Strategic Studies.

COOPERATION ON BOTH SIDES

The actors involved primarily in this ongoing civil war are the SAC forces with its militias Pyusawhti on one side and the PDFs, LDFs and their EAO allies like the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and Chin National Front (CNF) in Sagaing Region, including the Arakan Army (AA) in Magway Region to a lesser extent which helped train and partly equip the PDFs adjacent to its area.

According to Ye Myo Hein's recent report in United States Institute of Peace on 3 November 2022, it is important to understand the specifics of the resistance. “People's Defence Force” is a general understanding for three types of armed groups that emerged after the coup in February 2021. They are PDFs, Local Defence Forces (LDFs) and People’s Defence Teams (PaKhaPha/PDTs). The PDFs formed by NUG parallel shadow government that operate under joint command system with some EAOs; the LDFs local resistance militias that operate autonomously and locally; and the PDTs are localized guerrilla units formed for local defence and security purposes. The PDFs are sort of regular army which operate across the states-regions' townships, whereas the LDFs and PDTs are self-defence or community security militias operating at the community level.

Accordingly, there are roughly 65,000 total PDF troops. Approximately 20 percent of PDF troops are equipped with military-grade weapons and another 40 percent have home-made weapons. As of October 2022, there were around 300 PDF battalions with 200 to 500 troops each. Sixty-three additional battalions are awaiting NUG recognition.

“The PDFs in ethnic areas are operationally commanded by or affiliated with EAOs. For example, the Karenni People’s Defence Force (KPDF) is under the command of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Chinland Defence Force (CDF) is under the control of Chinland Joint Defence Committee (CJDC) and the

KNDF is closely affiliated with the Karenni Army (KA) of the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP).”

“There are currently three military division commands (MDCs). Some 200 PDF units currently operate under the command of MDC 1 with responsibility for the Kachin, Anyar (Central Myanmar) and Chin theatres. Approximately 50 PDFs operate in the areas of MDCs 2 and 3 which manage operations in the Karen and Karenni theatres, respectively,” according to the report.

The NUG estimates that there were 401 LDFs as of April 2022 and recent analysis estimates that there are at least 30,000 LDF personnel. They are self-funded, primarily through community and diaspora donations and rely mostly on home-made weapons, though some LDFs are connected with large EAOs which provide training and equipment. The LDFs are engaged in guerrilla warfare through landmines, skirmishes, sabotage and targeted killings, with the primary aim to deny the SAC control over rural areas.

The PDTs are formed by the NUG, specializing in urban guerrilla warfare, basic training for new resistance fighters, logistics, public mobilization and PDF support. They have been formed in 250 out of 330 townships.

Unlike conflicts the resistance struggles in such countries as Timor Leste or Afghanistan, where the top key commanders could be identified, the Spring Revolution warriors tend to hide behind a veil of anonymity.

HUMANITARIAN CEASEFIRE

Troublesome for the junta in 2022 was the strife they faced in Rakhine State earlier in the year. The state burst into flames again and the AA and the SAC fought each other not less than ten times in the Arakan and Chin states in July alone. Four months later, in November, a “humanitarian ceasefire” was reached between the SAC and the AA, mediated by the chairman of Japan’s Nippon Foundation, Yohei Sasakawa.

This leaves only the Shan State, out of all ethnic states, that is not fully enveloped with armed conflict, save for the northern part where there have been clashes on-and-off between the EAOs operating there and the junta's troops, including clashes between the PDFs of Karenni State, plus LDFs from Shan State with the junta in Moebye, Pekon area of southern Shan State at the most southern part bordering Kayah or Karenni State.

DIVIDE AND RULE

Amidst the chaos, the junta sought to divide-and-rule by holding a number of peace talks ever since April with some 10 EAOs already twice to reach at least a tentative political settlement, probably to ensure that they won't turn against it, while at the same time it is gearing to hold general elections in 2023, hoping to “legalize” its military coup - aiming perhaps like Thailand's ex-military leader Prayuth Chan-ocha, who staged a military coup and after rewriting a new constitution followed by a successful referendum, later became prime minister through elections and is still in power today.

The junta faces a military and political alliance that is in the process of formation. Politically, the ethnic-democratic loose alliance, which includes the parallel National Unity Government/People's Defence Forces (NUG-PDFs); some EAOs such as from the Chin, Kachin, Karenni, Karen; and assorted Local Defence Forces (LDFs) are for uprooting the SAC and are not interested in a negotiated settlement.

The Chin, Kachin, Karenni and Karen states' EAOs and their respective local PDFs are solidly behind the battle cry of “no negotiation and uprooting the military dictatorship” as a top priority so that a “federal democratic union” can be established. Thus, they are working in collaboration with the NUG and this trend is gaining momentum.

In Mon State, the New Mon State Party (NMSP), the main EAO within the state, is keen to negotiate peace with the junta and thus is left out of the resistance fray. But numerous local PDFs and Karen National Union (KNU) Brigade 1 are nevertheless engaged in the fight against the junta on Mon State soil.

What is clear is the SAC is committed to annihilate its opponents at all costs. In fact, the situation is highly polarized and both camps adamantly label each other as “terrorist” organizations.

FAR FROM THE END GAME

In short almost the whole country is resisting the junta's rule militarily.

Politically, the junta has not been able to make headway to replace Kyaw Moe Tun, who recently on 12 December was allowed to retain his UN ambassador position on behalf of the NUG for another year by the UN credentials committee, although this doesn't mean the recognition of the NUG at this moment in time. It is understood as preserving a member's country seat and not particularly endorsing any of the two rival governments, the NUG and SAC.

Moreover, the United States House of Representatives on 7 December passed a compromise version of the National Defence Authorization Act (NDAA), and on 15 December the senate also overwhelmingly approved it, which pledges to provide non-military assistance and to engage with Myanmar’s EAOs and the resistance forces or PDFs. This move has uplifted the ethnic-democratic opposition groups psychologically for the time being, but what will come out practically from this bill when it becomes law is still an open question.

For 2023, the junta is determined to hold general election by all means, coupled with annihilation offensive campaigns against all of its oppositions countrywide and instil fear and intimidation among the population so that the public will be subdued, cowed and submit to its rule. This two-pronged strategy seems to be the way the junta has chosen to embark upon, taking a cue from what it has done since the military coup.

In such a polarized situation between adversaries within the country, there is little likelihood that the ongoing civil war will be resolved in the short term. And politically, the fight to win legitimacy and recognition between the SAC and NUG will continue in the UN and international arena, if the development trends displayed this year are an indicator.

Sai Wansai for Mizzima