The Centre for Policy Research in India recently held a virtual panel discussion entitled, ‘Myanmar 2021: Another 1988, or a New Future?’

A senior visiting fellow offered the following commentary during the panel discussion.

I am honored to be part of this distinguished panel consisting of three of my several illustrious predecessors. It wish it was possible to have them all in the panel, but even without them, it is difficult to visualize a cast that brings such depth in time since the 1988 events, and personal experience at the highest diplomatic levels, to this discussion on Myanmar at this critical juncture in its history when a 7-stage ‘road map’ towards democracy charted out by former military leader, Sr. Gen. Than Shwe and the NLD’s efforts to bring in full civilian rule are in tatters and the future looks uncertain if not bloody. I agree with their argument that one of the lessons of 1988 is that we have to keep our channels of communication with the Tatmadaw open in our interest and those of the Myanmar people, but would like to add some new perspectives on the present circumstances and mood that make 2021 different from 1988. Like Afghanistan after the Soviet intervention, and Syria after the Arab spring, Myanmar may never be the same again, for good or bad.

I too would like to thank Meenakshi Gopinath for stepping in beyond the call of duty due to Yamini’s indisposition, and am gratified to see a great audience consisting of some very distinguished persons from different walks. I hope we can hear from them too in the discussions later.

I will try to avoid repeating what has already been said or go into the reasons for and legalities of the takeover, and dive straight into my reading of the situation now and what can be done about it. I may be a bit stark just to cut the clutter for the sake of clarity. Please excuse me if it is one-sided. We can take up qualifications or nuances in the Q&A.

First, even under the 2008 military-drafted Constitution, the coup was legally dubious. But with the military takeover, the Tatmadaw has assumed all executive, legislative, and judicial in addition to the monopoly of coercive power, and its weight in Parliament, government, the National Defence and Security Council and the General Administration that it already had. It has left the people no legal recourse to challenge it except public protest.

So far, this has been overwhelmingly peaceful, deploying both wit and imagination, but with over 700 fatalities from direct military action, arrests, detentions, draconian laws and much else, that patience is fraying and there are signs of the beginning of an armed resistance.

Second, the response of the Tatmadaw to the CDM and street protests is nothing other than a war by the Tatmadaw against its people regardless of race or religion, majority or minority. There is no finer point to it. This is not a civil war between some majority against some minority or vice versa with the military taking sides. The Tatmadaw is not serving any constituency other than itself. With its actions, it has lost all claim to being a force for stability. It is wedded only to its own institutional, business and personal interests and fear of accountability for past and current actions. With its back to the wall over the Rohingya issue, it feels it has nothing to lose.

Third, despite its monopoly of force and willingness to use it to terrorize and bludgeon the resistance into submission, it is doubtful if the military will be able to re-impose its version of ‘order’ as it did in the 1990s.

There are two major differences between the post 1988 period and now.

First, after 50 years of military rule and self-imposed isolation aggravated by western sanctions, the Myanmar people have tasted political, media and social media freedoms and economic and other opportunities since the USDP reforms of 2011. Importantly, with the opening and explosion of mobile connectivity, they have reconnected with the outside world and international community through smart phones, tourism, travel, education, business, the English language, IT and so on. They are not going to sacrifice these freedoms and opportunities. One expression of this is the Milk Tea Alliance that originated against Chinese authoritarianism in Hong Kong and has now spread to Thailand and Myanmar. They are determined not be thrown back to the 1960s with an internet wall in addition. They will fight.

Myanmar is a country with strong reserves of social solidarity and resilience against tragedies. It is one of the countries with the strongest traditions of charity. We are seeing this at work now. This struggle will continue.

A second major difference is that post 1988, in order to deal with the pro-democracy movement, the Tatmadaw reached out to the Ethnic Armed Organizations and signed individual peace agreements with most of them. In course of time, they were able to tap majoritarian sentiment to get the Bamar to resign themselves to military rule.

This time, in spite of overtures from the Sr. Gen, the EAOs are not responding. Rather, many of the more active and powerful ones are insisting on a roll back of military rule and standing with the CDM. Bamar civil society and ethnics are reaching out to each other in solidarity. Some are forging alliances. In the end, not all may join, and those who do may, may not be able to tip the balance.

Some ethnic parties have been wary of the NLD as it has encroached into their political territory in the 2015 and 2020 elections. But for most them, the Tatmadaw is their first and primary enemy. There have been intense clashes in Kachin and Karen areas to the north and the east, in which the Tatmadaw has used air power, in the latter case, sending thousands for refuge into Thailand from where they have been turned back. There are reports of the civil resistance training in EAO camps.

Fourth, in spite of all this, the CDM, CRPH, NLD, the GSCN and EAOs and parties may not prevail over the punitive power of the Tatmadaw. But neither will the Tatmadaw be able to suppress the resistance entirely. For all practical purposes the Tatmadaw will be reduced to the SLORC of an earlier period. There will be no space for ‘peace’, ‘development’, ‘union’ or ‘solidarity’ that entered the vocabulary of the military rulers with the SPDC and USDP. The resistance will mutate and move to the countryside and borders, including our borders. We will have to be prepared to host refugees, asylum seekers, journalists, political activists including the CRPH temporarily.

Unlike in the past when most of the activism took place eastwards towards Thailand, this time Sagaing Region stretching to the Indian border with many politically active towns like Debayin, seems to be growing as an epicenter of the struggle. There have been clashes and retaliation using hunting rifles and grenades in Kalay and Tamu across the border from Moreh in which perhaps a dozen security forces have lost their lives. Civil Defence groups have come up, and relatively low profile ethnic armed groups like the KNO (B), have become active. It is probably a matter of time before they seek alliances or support from kindred groups in India.

Fifth, whatever the outcome or whichever way it goes, there is likely to be a prolonged period of instability, perhaps even civil war or wars, or state collapse. It is difficult to visualize any governance during this period, let alone business, development, investment, tourism or economic growth. If the military has the upper hand, for all practical purposes, Myanmar will be thrown back into its self-imposed isolation and insulation of the 1960s, this time aggravated by a communications blockade.

Sixth, it will be next to impossible for any country including India, to realize any of their strategic, development or economic objectives in Myanmar under these circumstances. We will have to scrutinize every thing that we have taken for granted in terms of our concerns in Myanmar: security, defence and strategic interests; development and connectivity projects; trade and investment; Act East, for their worth. Under the circumstances, the Tatmadaw may not be able to help us much. Only two more compelling reasons for dealing with the Tatmadaw will remain: the interests 2 million Indian PIOs in Myanmar and keeping channels of communication and diplomacy through the Tatmadaw in our interests and those of the Myanmar people, open.

Seventh, while the resistance is preparing for a longer, perhaps even armed struggle, the CRPH is also getting more active. It has adopted a Charter that calls for a ‘federal democratic union’ and even a federal army that would appeal to the ethnic constituencies. It is seeking to create a National Unity Government wherever it can get a liberated space within Myanmar. It will soon reach out to the international community for recognition. India may be among the first.

Eighth, sooner or later, all countries will have to take sides. So far our statements have been good and received with hope but also with some doubt about our seriousness in some quarters. But good statements may not be enough. We will have to act, and be seen to act by the Myanmar people.

For the time being it is correct to leave diplomacy to the ASEAN family which is planning a Summit shortly. It can provide the most dignified fig leaf for the military to walk back the takeover.

But so far, the Tatmadaw has not shown any willingness to compromise. Consensus will be difficult. ASEAN unity will be tested and it has its own concerns regarding stability internally in several countries. ASEAN will insist on its centrality in dealing with Myanmar, but if it tends towards solutions tolerating the regime, it will lose credibility in Myanmar. It may then be necessary for other concerned countries and neighbors to step in. We may then have to think on our own.

What about the rest of the international community? Having looked at Myanmar purely morally and not strategically, and abandoned Myanmar since the 1990s until the Obama Administration, the US and the West in general have very little leverage or equity that they can use to make the military reverse course.

Despite its growing stake in Myanmar over the last 10-20 years, India too cannot influence the generals much by itself.

Japan too has equities with the Tatmadaw but is caught between the US and its own inclinations to engage diplomatically. It has ruled out new aid, but some of its companies have cut links with the Tatmadaw. That is an option.

Presently, there is only one country with the power to make the Tatmadaw change course, and that is China. But it will not be easy even for them. The Burmese have resisted the Chinese historically and the USDP kept the Chinese off balance through President Thein Sein’s term with its diplomatic opening to the West, Japan etc. and its suspension of the Myitsone Dam. Daw Suu too negotiated hard with the Chinese for Myanmar’s benefit.

There is a perception among the Myanmar public that the Chinese are behind and supporting the coup. Judging from their confused reactions to the coup, this may or may not true. The Tatmadaw would have taken Chinese support for granted. The Chinese will extract what they can from the vulnerability of the Tatmadaw, and the Tatmadaw may ‘buy’ Chinese support at the UN or other international fora. But they have the resources to hold out to Chinese blackmail for a while so long they have the Chinese market for their natural resources. China can also play the Chinese EAO card through those that it does influence.

If there is any country that may have emboldened Sr. Gen. to act decisively, it might be Russia. With its protection for the military action in the UN Security Council, Russia may have played its Indo-Pacific card against the Quad in Myanmar.

However, India cannot hide behind statements and the ASEAN too long.

First, if the scenario that I have painted is or comes true, India will have no option to sit it out. It will have to react to events, refugees, asylum seekers, conscientious objectors, and others distressed. The North East is the obvious place of refuge. We have to be prepared to open our hearts and arms to given shelter to the persecuted as we did from the 1960s to the 1990s when we had much less. With clashes taking place in Kalay and Tamu, it is already at our border.

Second, we must give discreet bilateral diplomacy a chance. This could be in the form of a visit by a Special Envoy of the PM to the Sr. Gen. to convey to the Generals that they have made a mistake, and their best bet for posterity is to turn back, restore the NLD as the legitimate government, and not mortgage the future of Myanmar for their interests.

An alternative is a chance at joint diplomacy: an India-Japan initiative that could be taken up during the imminent visit of the Japanese PM, or jointly with ASEAN countries if they are willing collectively or individually.

Third, if neither succeeds, we will have no option but to engage the CDM, CRPH, GSCN, Ethnic parties, etc., with a view to finding a political solution to the crisis. There is no guarantee that it will work; or even if the resistance is able to stage a revolution and throw off the military rulers, that there will be stability. The democratic alternative may itself may itself splinter and divide. But that is not something that we should assume.

Old templates won’t work. We have a chance to shape a democratic federal union or be stuck in a civil-military rut on the wrong side. Green shoots of a federal union are visible. We should encourage it.

There may be short term costs. We should be willing to pay it for long term gains. We will have to decide whether we want to be on the side of a hated military, as is the perception of China in Myanmar today right or wrong; or with the people and the popular will. We will also have to decide whether we want to be China ‘lite’ in the hope of preventing them falling further into China’s grip, or be the opposite, the India that has had a 2,500 year old civilizational and people to people relationship. We have to decide whether we will ‘Act East’ on the basis of people, or dictatorships, and which is more durable.

Thank you.

Courtesy of Centre of Policy Research, India