When speaking about Shan refugees in Thailand it is impossible to leave out the migrants, legal, illegal, asylum seekers and last but not least the stateless without proper documentation from Shan State.

Before the massive exodus of the 1990s due to the Myanmar Army or Tatmadaw's scorched earth operations to root out the Shan from central Shan State, there were already Shan or Tai living along the Thai-Shan border in Thailand, such as in Mae Hong Son, Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai.

To date, Shan sources based in Thailand conservatively estimate that the Shan migrant population is about one million, which represents about a third of the overall three million refugees and migrants from other Myanmar's ethnic states like Mon, Karen, Karenni, and Tanintharyi Region, including Bamar among others.

THREE CATEGORIES OF MIGRANTS

According to "Non-Military Transnational Networks of Armed Group: RCSS/SSA (Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army) in Burma and Shan NGOs in Thailand", written by Hideyuki Okano, Journal of Human Security Studies, Special Issue 2020-1:

“Some of the Shan people moved to present Thailand from present Burma before the two countries were established as a modern nation-state. It is recorded that Chao Kaeo Muang,prince of Chiang Mai, sent a survey team in 1831, which found settlements of Shan in the present province of Mae Hong Son. The flow of migrants to this area continues to this day. While the oldergenerations of migrants assimilated into Thailand – acquiring Thai citizenship, receiving formal education, and working legally – newer generations of migrants do not. In the 1990s and the early 2000s, large numbers of Shan people were displaced from Burma into Thailand due to deterioration of their living conditions resulting from the civil war. From the later 2000s to the present, migrants are more likely to go to Thailand seeking jobs. Nowadays, these newcomers populate low-paying sectors in Thailand, especially in the northern area, working illegally or with work permits as foreign labourers. One study shows that the Shan occupy one sixth of the population of 1.2 million people in the town of Chiang Mai.”

As such, the refugees or migrants may be categorized as early settlers before modern states were established; refugees fleeing the civil war in Burma in the 1990s; and from 2000s to the present immigration of the people from Shan State out of security concerns because of the armed clashes and for pure livelihood and economic reasons, or both.

It is extremely hard to come up with a concrete Shan refugee and migrant count as the fluctuation is high because many migrants also return back to their homestead after a few years for various reasons.

But according to a 13 October 2021 Bangkok Post report: “It was reported that 2.3 million regular migrant workers from Myanmar lived in Thailand in 2019. The real number is estimated to be higher because this estimate failed to include the number of irregular migrant workers. Myanmar migrant workers also generated US$2.8 billion in remittances, equivalent to more than 4% of Myanmar's GDP.”

How many of the migrants entering Thailand from southern Shan State are working in Thailand or fleeing the civil war to become permanent refugees is hard to fathom.

According to "MIGRATION IN SOUTHERN SHAN STATE: CHARACTERISTICS AND OUTCOMES", written by Eaindra Theint Theint Thu, Khun Moe Htun, and Ben Belton, in Research Paper 136, Food Security Policy Research Papers, July 2019, funded by USAID and various countries:

“Migration is a common phenomenon in southern Shan. Nearly one in three households (31%) have a household member who has ever migrated. At the time of the survey, 14% of households had a migrant and 7% of individuals of working age were migrating. However, southern Shan has developed as a migrant sending area less rapidly than other areas of the country.”

Migrant flows began to increase rapidly from 2009. Six times more individuals migrated for the first time in 2017 than in 2009.”

Thailand is the most common destination for migrants from southern Shan and eighty-eight percent of current international migrants work in Thailand, according to the research paper.

CURRENT SITUATION

The actual situation on the ground in the aftermath of the February military coup last year by the Burmese military junta is summed up by a knowledgeable, well-informed Shan source as follows.

• The Shan refugee figure, which is said to be about 300,000 is an estimation mentioned by Shan Human Rights Foundation and Shan Women Action Network in their “Licence to Rape” report from 1996-98, may not reflect the real present situation.
• The recent Shan refugees fleeing the Tatmadaw and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and as well the inter-ethnic armed conflicts are considered by the Thai authorities as migrant workers and often harassed and jailed without receiving any proper help from any quarters.
• According to an illegal immigrant who has applied for a temporary passport called a Certificate of Identification (CI) in 2016, there were 66,000 applicants for some form of ID only in the city of Chiang Mai. This didn't include other document holders, like pink cards (Displaced Person with Burmese Nationality ID Cards); green cards with red line framing (Highlander’s Survey Cards); Myanmar passport holders who had overstayed and so on. After six years the migrant count may have multiplied many-fold.
• Five IDP camps along Thai-Shan border and one refugee camp are now not aided and recognized by UN and since 2017, have some 6,000 displaced people.
• The recent Shan refugees fleeing the civil war waged between the Tatmadaw and EAOs; and as well inter-ethnic armed conflict and brotherly war between the two Shan armies of RCSS and SSPP, that came through uncontrolled border passes, were unable to be absorbed into the Thai labour market and are facing real hardships to survive at present. The Thai farming sector which relies on fruit export markets like China and EU were said to be scaling back due to coronavirus pandemic and this in turn affected the labour market severely.
• Besides, the Shan, Palaung or Ta'ang and the Pa-O ethnic groups were also fleeing the civil war. The Palaung or Ta'ang from northern Shan State fleeing the inter-ethnic conflict between the RCSS and TNLA, including to avoid the forced recruitment into the latter's army. The Pa-Os were said to be having difficulties to enter Thailand lately due to the prohibition of the Tatmadaw manning the Salween River crossing in Takaw and Tasang. The Pa-O National Organization (PNO) headed by Aung Kham Hti is allied with the Myanmar Army and could have asked the latter to block the Pa-Os seeking to flee the civil war from leaving the country.

TROUBLED PILOT PROJECT

Resettlement plans for displaced people in Myanmar have been limited and problematic, in part due to recent fighting.

Unlike the Karen relocation plan funded by The Nippon Foundation which has built some 100 houses at Lay Kay Kaw Village for conflict-affected people in Southeast Myanmar, Karen State and handed over in March 2017 to the Karen National Union (KNU) and Karen Peace Council (KPC), for the Shan refugees there is no such concrete plan, only a pilot project that went astray.

However, Lay Kay Kaw Village which is supposed to be a sanctuary for the Karen refugees was attacked by the Myanmar Army in November 2021 accusing that the KNU harboured the People's Defence Force (PDF) of National Unity Government (NUG), its rival opposition.

“An indication that the Burmese authorities are not expecting refugees to return anytime soon is the fact that a pilot housing project in Mong Hta for returning refugees is now occupied by Burmese government staff,” according to the Shan State Refugee Committee (SSRC) - Thai Border report of 23 May 2019.

Mong Hta, 20 kilometres from the Thai border in south-west Mongton township, was formerly a Shan village in Mong Tai Army (MTA) territory, which prospered from lying on a busy trading route between the Salween River and the Thai border crossing of Lak Taeng.

After the MTA surrendered at the end of 1995, the Burma Army took over Mong Hta, causing most

of the original inhabitants to flee. When the RCSS/SSA then set up camps along the adjacent border areas, Mong Hta became an important Burma Army frontline stronghold against the RCSS/SSA.

It thus appeared to be a significant concession from the Burmese government in the RCSS/SSA’s Union-level ceasefire agreement in January 2012: “To allow RCSS/SSA headquarters in Homein sub-township and Mong Hta sub-township.” (Ho Mein/Mong was the former MTA HQ area, about 60 kilometres west of Mong Hta).

However, this agreement was never honoured. The Burma Army never retreated from Mong Hta or Ho Mong, and RCSS/SSA was only allowed a small liaison office in Mong Hta.

Despite this, attempts were made by the Burmese authorities to persuade refugees in Thailand to return to Mong Hta. In mid-2012, the Norwegian Refugee Council (working under the Myanmar

Peace Support Initiative) visited Koung Jor refugee camp on the northern Chiang Mai border, and informed the camp leader they were planning to fund a pilot housing project for 90 refugees to return to Mong Hta. In July 2013, the Koung Jor camp leader was informed by the military commander in Mong Taw that new housing was being built for returning refugees in Mong Hta. Soon afterwards, some Burmese policemen from Tachileik visited the refugee camp, and asked if the refugees wanted to return to Mong Hta.

Since then, about 20 houses, a new school and a hospital have been built in Mong Hta. However, no refugees have dared to return, due to fear of the Burma Army – whose IB 244 camp lies only about 400 meters from the new housing--- and of the landmines strewn around the area.

Today, the pilot refugee housing project is occupied by Burmese government staff working in Mong Hta.

RELUCTANCE TO RETURN HOME

Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust, based in the UK released a Burma Report titled, “No Funding, No Food and No Safe Return - End of Funding Leaves Shan People Facing Starvation”, on January 2018, outlining four reasons why Shan refugees and IDPs living in camps along the Thai-Burma border are unable to return home.

They are 1. Ongoing Burma Army expansion in Shan State; 2. Ongoing attacks and human rights violations by the Burma Army; 3. Original villages lie derelict or have been occupied; and 4. Threat of permanent loss of lands from mega-projects.

To No. 1: “Since the 1996-1998 forced relocation in central Shan State, the number of Burma Army troops has expanded hugely in the relocated areas. In 2011, the Burma Army set up its 14th Regional Command – the Central Eastern Command – in Kho Lam, Namzarng township, right in the centre of the 1996-1998 forced relocation area. Formerly a small village with one Burma Army battalion, Kho Lam has become a huge military installation with 27 battalions,” the report says.

To No. 2: The continued armed clashes between the RCSS and Burma Army was mentioned even though the former has signed a ceasefire agreement in 2011 and later the nationwide ceasefire agreement in October 2015. The Burma Army has also continued to commit gross human rights violations against civilians in ceasefire areas, including extrajudicial killing, torture, and sexual violence, which was well documented by SHRF.

To No. 3: “Over 1,400 villages were forcibly relocated by the Burma Army between 1996-1998 and hundreds now no longer exist as villagers have not dared return. Houses and temples have fallen derelict, and lands are either overgrown or have been taken over by the Burma Army and their allied militia. For instance, the township of Murng Nai – one of eleven townships where forced relocation took place – used to have a total of 224 villages before 1996. Today, according to official township immigration lists, only 83 villages remain (of which 27 are “new” villages), indicating that 168 villages have been completely erased,” the report writes.

To No. 4: “Refugees from areas where the Burmese government has planned large hydropower dams or mining projects will lose their homes if these projects go ahead.” They are for example, the giant Tasang (now called Mong Ton dam) on the Salween River, a joint venture with Thai and Chinese companies for export of power to Thailand, of which nearly 50,000 people were forcibly

relocated from this area in 1996-1998 and if the dam goes ahead, many will never be able to return home. Similarly, the large lignite mine and coal fired power plant project planned by the Burmese military-owned Myanmar Economic Corporation and Italian-Thai Power Company in Mong Kok, Mong Hsat Township, will make the entire tract, with over 1,000 Shan, Lahu and Akha residents, uninhabitable.

To add to these four points, the ongoing countrywide civil war which also affects the Shan State, and has seen an uptick since the 2021 coup, will discourage IDPs and refugees from returning home.

Moreover, the brotherly war between the two Shan armies, RCSS and Shan State Progress Party (SSPP); and the inter-ethnic conflict war between the RCSS and three EAO members SSPP, Ta'ang National Liberation Army, and UWSA have made the population at large lose their orientation as to which group they should support.

One thing is for sure – all the ethnic groups in Shan State have suffered physically, economically and mentally, many forced to pay taxes, serve as cannon fodder, and also to bear the agony of war.

There should be little surprise that the displaced – whether IDPs or refugees – are in no rush to return home.

DIRE SITUATION

The Shan displaced are like shadows – hiding out in-country or under uncertain immigrant status abroad – numbering a million or more.

There is only one refugee camp called Kong Jor, not even officially recognized, with a few hundred inhabitants – a forgotten settlement that has not received international help since 2017 due to the false belief back then that Myanmar was peaceful and a ceasefire had been signed.

The bulk of the displaced can be found maintaining a low profile working as stateless cheap labourers in Thailand's cities such as Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, Mae Sai and Bangkok.

Given the difficulties in the Shan people’s homeland, a return is not on the cards.