Sun Lee

China has been an influential player in Myanmar's internal affairs since its independence in 1948. Chinese influence manifests at various levels in Myanmar today. Bilaterally, China’s relationship with the military-led government has given the latter diplomatic dividends. Domestically, China has very good ties with the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAO), which makes it the ideal mediator between the government and the EAOs. A combination of security and economic interests have thus made China turn to Myanmar and establish close ties, especially after the military coup in early 2021. 

The Myanmar gambit is part of China’s larger plan of penetrating South Asia for security and economic gains at the cost of India. The nature and scale of China’s links to the Myanmar’s ruling establishment has been subject to considerable scrutiny, with some observers noting that Myanmar is a little wary of Chinese influence, but the latter’s penetration is so deep and pervasive that it is difficult for the government to give up the link.

According to Myanmar’s Investment and Companies Directorate, between the coup and February 2023, China invested more than US$ 113 million (Radio Free Asia, 07.04.2023). China is the second-largest foreign investor after Singapore in Myanmar. China has never wavered in its support for the junta since its 1 February 2021 coup, and while other countries have condemned the military regime, pulled
their investments, and refrained from trading with the nation, China has chosen to step up engagement with the generals in Naypyidaw. 

Historically, China has dealt only with the military leadership during the more than five decades of junta rule in Myanmar since 1962. The primary reason for widespread anti-China sentiment in Myanmar can be attributed to China’s overt and covert support for the country’s military rulers. Internationally isolated in the aftermath of the coup, China provided diplomatic support to protect the regime from international condemnation and humanitarian intervention, China has made concerted efforts to block United Nations resolutions that expressed concern over the military and its actions. Also, China has provided Myanmar with loans, investments, and trade to keep the economy afloat.

Significantly, Chinese military equipment has also enabled the generals to quell anti-junta protests and fight insurgencies. Pertinently, many Myanmar locals view the robust and multifaceted Chinese support to the military as being a crucial factor that ensures the longevity of the junta’s rule.

One of the best examples of China’s presence in Myanmar is the Kyaukphyu Port, under construction on the western most tip of Myanmar, adjoining the Bay of Bengal. It lies in Rakhine State, which also has infrastructure assets like the Kaladan multi-modal transport corridor, in which India has invested. Recent reports indicate that Chinese activities in the region have intensified in myriad ways. Chinese nationals working in Kyaukphyu are said to have married local Rakhine women in the past few years to become a part of the social landscape. A 2019 Human Rights Watch report revealed cases of trafficking of girls from the states of Kachin and Shan into China, where they are married off to Chinese men.

Myanmar nationals of Chinese descent are buying property in Ann, Maei, Kyaukphyu and Ramree townships, anticipating good price appreciation once the Kyaukphyu SEZ Deep Sea Port Project
becomes operational.

How has China managed to acquire land in Myanmar? Extant laws actually make it quite easy for foreigners to do so. Chinese nationals have acquired land in Myanmar either through marriage or by getting Myanmar citizenship by bribing the immigration authorities. The military regime is suspected of having issued IDs cards to Chinese citizens in an effort to influence the forthcoming election. Real estate agents close to the military regime are threatening locals to sell their land or get it confiscated without
any compensation. Commander of North-Eastern Command, Brig. Gen. Naing Naing Oo’s son has emerged as the biggest real estate dealer in Lashio township and is the only contact for Chinese buyers.

Shan State’s capital Lashio, a trading hub between China and Myanmar, is being developed as a China township by converting farmland into commercial plots. Wealthy Kokang businessmen of Chinese origin are rushing to buy land in Lashio to construct casinos and gambling dens. The decline in the economy has forced citizens to sell their land to make ends meet rendering the locals to rent out their premises for running gambling activities. Similarly, a cross-border Economic Zone in Chinshwehaw, linking the Shan
township of Laukkai, the capital of the Kokang Special Autonomous Zone, to Lincang in Yunnan province is being constructed (The Print, 11 May 2022). Transit through this route provides the shortest path from Kunming to the deep-water port of Kyaukphyu. 

However, Laukkai, with its 30 casinos and 50 hotels, has gained a reputation as a violent and crime-ridden frontier town. In recent years, the Chinese government has been embarrassed by a number of overseas Chinese crime syndicates.

For instance, scandals involving Kokang-run casinos eventually triggered an intervention to shut down their casinos in the southern Cambodian town of Sihanoukville. In Myanmar, the most notorious example (The Diplomat, 4 May 2022) is the case of Shwe Kokko Yatai New City in Myawaddy township (Karen State), close to the Thai border. This was the first project in Myanmar that claimed to be associated with the BRI, but it was publicly disavowed by the Chinese government in a public statement saying that “this is a third-country investment and has nothing to do with the Belt and Road Initiative.”

Radio Free Asia reports (22 September 2023) that about 1,400 migrant workers (500 carrying single-use temporary border pass, viz., green card and 900 carrying border travel permit viz., red book) are entering China through Muse in Shan State despite a recent wage cut by half by the Chinese employers. 

Desperate for work amid the current economic downturn, thousands have been hoping to use the TBP scheme to find long-term employment in China, even though it’s only meant for short-term visits. Since
most of the migrant workers are from conflict-ridden villages in Sagaing, Magway, Mandalay regions and Shan state, the move could be part of a joint strategy of otherwise populous China and Myanmar’s ruling military regime to wean local youth away from anti-regime resistance groups.

Of far greater significance is a recent report that states that China is exploring likely sites of nuclear technology projects in Sagaing and Mandalay regions after Myanmar Ambassador to China sought (16 September 2023) advanced nuclear technology from China for use in Myanmar’s agriculture, health and energy sectors. A release by Myanmar’s foreign ministry said the Ambassador, Tin Maung Swe, made the request at the China-ASEAN Forum for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology in Nanning, China. The request makes China the second country to be approached by Myanmar regarding nuclear technology. Currently, the military-led government is collaborating with Russia’s state-owned nuclear corporation Rosatom after opening the country’s first nuclear information center in Yangon early this year. The various facets of China’s penetration of Myanmar makes it clear that Beijing is present in a big way in Myanmar.

While its cultivation of the military over the years has given it an edge, the real difference is in the Chinese penetration of the socio-economic landscape. It is this factor which makes the spread of Chinese influence, mostly negative, in Myanmar, an inescapable reality.

Sun Lee is a pseudonym for a writer who covers Myanmar and Asian affairs