Ko Thiwn (MT) 

Although the Myanmar military junta was not invited to the ASEAN-U.S. Special Summit held in Washington, D.C., on 12-13 May 2022, the US State Department did invite the Foreign Affairs Minister of National Unity Government (NUG) to visit the US and hold meetings. The NUG’s Foreign Affairs Minister met with the Deputy Secretary of State Ms Wendy Sherman on 12 May. This official invitation marks significant diplomatic progress regarding the Burmese Spring Revolution, the latest version of the Federal Democratic Revolution of Burma, as well as an important development in recognition of the NUG. 

While the steps taken up by the US are pleasing, the signals and impacts on China’s foreign policy towards Burma must be noticed. Now is the right time to analyze the likely causes and future changes of China’s views and actions towards the Spring Revolution. China has an important relationship and strategic interest with Burma, and the potential consequences of China’s policies as well as which proactive strategies the Spring Revolution can take to seek the best result should be considered carefully. 

China’s position since the coup 

Some information can be initiated in this brainstorming regarding China’s actions since the military executed its coup on 1 February 2021. Just after the coup, China seemed to cautiously approach Burmese affairs. In March 2021, they objected to the statement of the UN Security Council using the word “coup”, since the Burmese military had insisted that they did not stage an unlawful coup and instead they had declared a legal state of emergency. On the other hand, China agreed to condemn the violence and arbitrary arrests against the peaceful protestors and backed the calls to uphold democratic institutions and norms. 

Following April 2021, after ASEAN agreed to the Five-Points Consensus, China supported ASEAN’s approach. It seems like they have enabled a delay to wait and see how the Burmese conflict will resolve from some distance. In September 2021, the Communist Party of China invited the National League for Democracy (NLD), which was the ruling party before the coup and won the 2020 general elections, to the Summit of Asian Political Parties and sent the signal to the junta to halt efforts to dissolve the NLD. In the United Nations General Assembly, China allowed the status quo of keeping Burma’s existing UN Ambassador, Kyaw Moe Tun, to retain the seat representing the country.  

The Chinese government was in some ways sitting on the fence and waiting to see the potential winning horse before committing its bet. 

From the beginning of 2022, it has become visible that the military junta could not fully control the country. Based on data from the media, less than 60 per cent of the country could be controlled by the junta with frequent unrest. Furthermore, the military faces huge economic failure, an unbelievable number of defectors, the massive Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), and growing armed resistance movements formed by the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAO) and brave volunteers. The junta has responded with brutal oppression and heinous atrocities, causing more disorder. Although no one can exactly predict whether or when the junta might be defeated, it can be said that the junta is in the most difficult and weakest position since the 1962 coup.  

In this environment, in April 2022, China invited the junta-appointed Foreign Affairs Minister to meet and discuss cooperation and other political matters, promising to provide financial support. China has started to reveal its recognition of the junta.    

China’s approach going forward? 

There can be three possible logical ideas for China’s Burma policy going forward. China may think that if the US has upgraded its relationship with the NUG, then it also should enhance its relationship with the NUG. Or they may think that if the US is supporting the NUG as its proxy in their neighbouring country, then they should also increase the support to the junta as their counter proxy. Alternatively, China may consider there is still no clear winner and continue to follow a more careful approach by building its relationships and support with both the junta and the NUG. Each possible logical input will shape the changes in China’s policy and deal with Burma in different ways. Which approach is more likely to come into play?  

Now two possible concerns of China can be seen, which could mistakenly push China to forge closer ties with the junta. The first is based on their suspicion that the NUG and other Spring Revolution actors are proxies of the West. The second concern is that a possible security vacuum could hurt political stability in the future.  

How should the Spring Revolution address China’s concerns? 

For the first concern regarding the Spring Revolution’s relationship with the West, the NUCC and NUG should strongly stick to Burma’s independent and active foreign policy line. They should maintain and strengthen active relationships with all members of the international community. This includes neighbouring countries, ASEAN, Western states, the UN, and others. They must build regular and official relations with the Chinese Government at various levels. They must keep communicating that they are always working for the interests of both countries, based on the fact that they are the only ones that can work with the genuine support of the people and practice a people-centred approach. Although the US has provided more publicly vocal support for the NUG and NUCC and opposition to the junta, the Spring Revolution should continue to actively seek to build its relationship with China and allay fears that the NUG and NUCC lack independence. Only then can sustainable and sound results from the cooperation of the two countries be carried out. 

For the second concern regarding a potential security vacuum, the NUCC and NUG must communicate to China, and others in the international community, about the situation on the ground and their plans to address these concerns. China seeks stability in Burma. Therefore, they are sure to support the side they expect to win and that they expect can maintain stability. They may have security concerns about who can protect their interests at the current time as well as whether there may become a future security vacuum. China may believe that the military would be capable of preventing these scenarios, so they have been increasingly supporting the junta. These concerns may also influence Burma’s other neighbours. 

However, it is increasingly clear that the junta itself has been the cause of instability. The junta is not only incapable of enforcing the most basic stability, it is itself the driver of political, humanitarian, and economic disaster. The military is the party that is committing atrocities and driving refugees across borders. Furthermore, for over 60 years the military has proven it is incapable of governing Burma peacefully—only leading to more and more conflict and division. The NUG and NUCC should communicate these facts to the right audiences in China and other neighbouring countries. 

It is also important to develop and explain the specific roles and comprehensive strategies of the existing EAOs and newly-formed People’s Defense Forces during the current interim period. The NUG and NUCC should explain their vision for transitional arrangements, including for reform of the security sector and command structures as well as for developing the transitional constitution that will replace the current Federal Democracy Charter. The NUCC has the responsibility to coordinate these strategies and plans as well as to consult with other anti-junta organizations to maintain political stability in the future. The NUCC’s role as a consultative platform is very important. The deliberation among the forces on this platform about the future federal design will be most important for future political stability. 

The NUCC and NUG must also foresee and prepare the best strategy for addressing the historic challenges Burma has faced when trying to build a shared Federal Democratic Union. There have been many failures since the independence, due to mistrust, betrayal, chauvinism, and behaviours that ran counter to the federal democratic norms. The NUCC and NUG will require a strategy to maintain political stability and equality among the stakeholders. They all must deliberate and decide among themselves what type of federalism is best for Burma, and all the decisions must be up to them collectively. That is based on the authentic Coming-Together concept and to avoid the chauvinistic or Guardianship mindset dominated by one ethnic group. However, the junta would never be able to deliver a stable political system. It cannot gain the support of the people or coordinate agreement among all Burma’s ethnicities and political actors. 

Therefore, the forces in the leading roles of the Spring Revolution should maintain independent and active diplomatic relations with the West as well as the neighbouring countries, especially with China. In the meantime, they should try to overcome the concerns of the international communities, especially China and other neighbouring countries, regarding the post-conflict political stability of the country. To do this, the revolutionary forces must be able to prove two things. The first is to show that they have the systematic armed resistance based on a strong central command and the second is to show that they already have well-formulated transitional arrangements, agreed upon through inclusive deliberation to obtain concrete conflict-resolution after the Spring Revolution. In addition, it is important to be cautious that China’s defence of the NLD party’s existence does not contribute to pushing the party to enter the junta-orchestrated façade elections in 2023. These coming elections are in no way democratic and can only serve to bring confusion to the international community and distract from the underlying problems Burma faces.