The unsettling truth is that there is a yawning gap between the two sides in the battle for Myanmar’s soul.

This is made abundantly clear in “Resolving the Crisis in Myanmar,” a report by the Euro-Burma Office published 12 October, that offers insight into the positions of the various Myanmar players, outlining the difficulties faced by those who wish to travel the road to peace in Myanmar.

BAD MOVE

What is clear is Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing (MAH) and the Myanmar military made a strategic miscalculation when they launched their coup on 1 February 2021, according to the report. Concerned by the inability of the Myanmar military to control the democratization process launched in 2011, the generals decided to recalibrate the process. They thought they could get away with manipulating the 2008 Constitution, imposing military rule, changing some rules, holding new elections within a year and restoring order.

The stark reality, however, is the junta plan has been delayed for almost three years with only a flicker of light at the end of the tunnel for the generals.

MAH and his commanders when they stepped in on that February 2021 morning had not realized the extent to which democracy had taken hold in Myanmar during the previous ten years. The access to information and the freedom to express one’s opinion afforded by cheap SIM cards and the internet, had almost completely changed Myanmar society.

Instead of an ignorant subservient society, the youth were better informed and more assertive. The military’s political moves could no longer be explained away as in the past. The new generation immediately saw through the hypocrisy and resisted MAH’s attempts to legitimize his rule.

And the 2020 landslide election win of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy party should have thrown up a warning sign.

NOT LIKE BEFORE

MAH’s second mistake was to think that, if the military came down hard on the opposition, it would crumble as in the past, as in the 1980s and 1990s, valiant though those uprisings were. MAH’s brutal and savage suppression of public street protests in 2021 created a backlash. Instead of buckling, the opposition came back with a tough and violent reaction.

This yawning gap between the two sides poses a serious problem. Neither the Myanmar military, under the guise of the State Administrative Council (SAC), nor the democratic resistance symbolized by the National Unity Government (NUG), and others, currently has the capacity to wipe out the other side militarily.

What this means is the SAC’s escalation of violence targeting civilians and non-combatants, an increase in brutality and savagery in the civil war, will leave the country irreversibly divided. This is likely to mean

a prolonged deadlock, intensified conflict and possibly the collapse of the economy that will deepen the crisis and may destabilize the region.

That said, the report claims common ground among the numerous and diverse domestic stakeholders (possibly with the exception of the military) can still be found through a dignified and honest dialogue amongst equals, if desired. An equitable political solution might be found if regional and international powers support domestic efforts and do not try to impose their own interest-based solutions by backing one group or the other.

That said, the Myanmar military, the largest and most powerful armed combatant in the conflict, does not seem to have plans to negotiate. It appears determined to hold onto power at all costs.

FINDING A SOLUTION

What is clear at the moment is the Myanmar junta is hunkered down seeking to take steps including holding a national election, possibly within the next two years, in order to put a “democratic face” on its rule, desperately holding on to power.

But, as the report points out, the steps being taken, including maintaining the military-written 2008 Constitution will not win over the Myanmar population, and the results of the “sham” election, as critics refer to it, will not be accepted. It also points out that there are a plethora of views put forward by the range of players from the NUG to the Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations and the Ethnic Armed Organizations, some of the latter allied with the junta, or sitting on the fence – as seen by the recent EAO attendance at the 8th anniversary of the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) that is not worth much more than the paper it is written on.

The report attempts to lay out options for negotiations and possible peace, including involvement of ASEAN – that so far has failed miserably with their Five-Point Consensus – and a call to explore international, even United Nations, mediation.

ROAD MAP FOR A DIALOGUE

Regardless of whether it is an ASEAN solution or any other agreed solution, the road map envisioned by most of the opposition is radically different from the SAC road map. Both sides are far apart.

Take a look at the SAC. They want to suppress the opposition; host a peace conference with select stakeholders – pliant EAOs and political parties; get the peace conference to endorse the SAC’s proposed amendments to the 2008 Constitution; hold elections – electronically or even with 50 per cent of the townships participating; install a new “elected” government to amend the 2008 Constitution (while maintaining the military’s role in Myanmar politics indefinitely); and continue military rule in Myanmar through the new government.

In the other corner, the opposition or resistance wants to stop all hostile acts of violence, especially against civilian targets; grant access to domestic and international humanitarian aid providers; initiate an inclusive and equal dialogue process, internationally facilitated and supervised and jointly-implemented (from 1994 till 2010, the UNGA called for a dialogue amongst the military, the democracy movement and the ethnic communities); initiate a credible transitional justice process, assisted by the international community; form a joint Transitional Authority, internationally facilitated and supervised; draft a new constitution for a federal democratic union and a new electoral system (a withdrawal of the military from

politics must be agreed and implemented); hold elections under the new Constitution; and last but not least, establish a federal and democratic nation.

How these two road maps can be reconciled is the challenge. Myanmar is at a crossroads. If the Myanmar military persists in destroying the country, the opposition will have no choice but to stop it by force. Or the military can stop and negotiate a transition. Either way, the Myanmar military’s days of absolute power are numbered.

But one thing is certain, the Myanmar military will not negotiate unless the capacity of the opposition is strengthened to the point where it is able to cooperate and coordinate and bring the war closer to Naypyidaw.

“Resolving the Crisis in Myanmar” provides a useful overview but the hard facts are there is no clear path to resolution.