Following the 1 February military coup in Myanmar, the political landscape and the conflicts and tensions in the ethnic states and regions have changed considerably compared with the earlier eras of military rule.
From the change, three types of conflict patterns stand out. First is the conflict between the coup-maker military junta or State Administration Council (SAC) and the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs). The second is the inter-ethnic conflict. And third is the conflict between the National Unity Government's (NUG) armed wing known as People's Defence Forces (PDF), including various local armed resistance groups, and the SAC.
The status quo of the EAOs versus the military junta has altered tremendously and heightened the conflict in general because of the military coup, especially in the Arakan (Rakhine), Chin, and Kayah or Karenni states. Additionally, a new conflict pattern of the SAC against the PDF has emerged due to the rebellion of the majority of ethnic Bamar people, including others, in the seven regions or divisions, as they consider the junta has taken away their partially won freedom and democratic way of life and is backsliding into the military dictatorship of time gone by.
Conflict in the Ethnic States
Arakan (Rakhine) State
In Arakan State, the unofficial ceasefire between the junta SAC and the Arakan Army (AA) which began in November 2020 has been held until December 2021.
But the uneasy truce was disrupted once on November 9 in the north of Maungdaw when junta troops entered AA's territory, according to the AA spokesman Khaing Thuka.
While the junta is not enthusiastic about the AA administration expansion in Arakan State due to the junta's withdrawal of many police stations across the state, it is reluctant to start an all-out war on AA for fear of spreading its troops too thinly across the country, given the countrywide uprising against its rule.
On December 10, AA warned its population in a statement to be vigilant as the junta's disruption of public mobility, measures to counter AA's civil administration, and disruption of food distribution affecting the population could lead to open armed conflict.
The open-armed conflict has not occurred yet but the junta's troops suppression of the Arakan population in contested areas to contain the AA administrative expansion could erupt into war soon.
Chin State
Chin State had no armed conflict before the February coup. But now, according to the Institute for Strategy and Policy (ISP)-Myanmar, the PDF formed under NUG and local resistance groups number some 14 altogether, although the actual count may be more.
The only EAO in Chin State is Chin National Front (CNF) if the AA stationed around Paletwa in southern Chin State which borders the Arakan State is not counted. CNF allied with the NUG from the beginning but came into conflict only after the Chin PDF and local resistance openly confronted the junta's troops militarily first. Mindat Chinland Defence Force (CDF) was the one that ignited the open rebellion in late April, with the CNF eventually drawn in.
Reportedly the CNF later conducted military training for hundreds of resistance group volunteers. In October the Chinland Defence Operation Committee with local resistance groups was formed which has been active across Chin State to coordinate attacks on SAC troops.
The military junta has started a massive offensive in Chin State in early October employing thousands of troops to wipe out the resistance, entering Chin State via two main routes, with one group travelling in separate columns to Falam and Hakha from the Sagaing Region town of Kalay in the north, and another heading to the town of Mindat from Magway Region’s Pakokku in the south. By year's end, the operation is still ongoing.
Kachin State
In Kachin State, the Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/KIA) started escalating the fight in the aftermath of the February coup, reasoning that the SAC didn't adhere to its demand not to shoot and kill anti-junta demonstrators.
The KIA sized at least 10 junta's army bases in March which the junta hasn't been able to retake. Besides, it trained many of the rebellious youth from all over the country who were able to make it to its territories.
The KIA actively collaborated with the Sagaing PDF and local resistance movements in facing the SAC's military offensives in Sagaing area. Unconfirmed news said that it also supplied weapons to the PDF operating in divisions like Sagaing, Mandalay, Mongywa and elsewhere.
Col Naw Bu spokesman of KIA said there are three kinds of PDF, one is under KIA, one under the NUG, and another was formed independently by the locals in different areas, according to a Khit Thit Media report of 2 December.
Armed clashes between the KIA and junta troops have been occurring almost daily. While the KIO/KIA isn't officially in league with the NUG, the Kachin News Group on 9 December reported that Dr Tu Hkawng, NUG’s minister for natural resources and environmental conservation, said they will sell bonds through the KIO network domestically. To make this project a reality, NUG has been working closely with the Kachin Political Interim Coordination Team, he said. Reportedly, the bond sale will benefit all the revolutionary groups as it will be distributed to all.
Shan State
The military coup also impacted Shan State. But the intensity of the PDF movement was minimum in comparison with the other states such as the Chin and Karenni states, as the SAC conflict with the EAOs in northern Shan State and inter-ethnic conflict in northern and southern parts of the state looms larger.
However, in the PDF category movement, Northern Shan State Defence Force (NSSDF) with seven-member parties (Namkham, Muse, Hsenwi, Lashio, Hsipaw, Kyaukme, Nawnghkio) was formed on October 25. Similarly, the southern Shan State PDF alliance was formed with five-member parties (Taunggyi, Kalaw, Ayethayar, Shwe Nyaung, Ywa Ngan), on 11 December.
Starting 7 February, anti-coup rallies were held in big cities like Taunggyi, Aung Pan, Lashio, Kengtung, Tachileik, Hsipaw and Kyaukme and a fair share of human rights violations and killings of demonstrators were registered. But as the junta resorted to a more lethal crackdown by shooting to kill, the civil disobedience movements and rallies were driven underground. And in the process, a few PDF and local resistance groups emerged from the situation. But it is fair to say that the movement’s effectiveness, in terms of hurting the junta and mobilizing the population has been minimal compared to the other types of conflict patterns.
The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) recent spate of fighting, which falls into the armed conflict pattern of EAOs versus SAC, was first reported in early July and has been going on ever since as the latter is continuing with its offensive operations. Sporadic on-and-off firefights between the SAC troops with KIA and TNLA also happened throughout the year.
Another type of inter-ethnic conflict between the two Shan EAOs, the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) and Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) that has been going on from 2016 heightened in 2021, covering Hsipaw, Kyaukme, Tanyan in northern Shan State and Kehsi, Mong Kung and Laikha in southern Shan State. SSPP is assisted by the Ta'ang National Liberation Front (TNLA) in the fighting and it is believed that the United Wa State Army (UWSA) also participated from time to time to fight the RCSS. The RCSS has accused the involved parties against it as waging a proxy war on behalf of China, as China considers the RCSS to be pro-West and does not like to see it operating in northern Shan State.
Sources close to the ethnic armed groups confirmed that the seven-member ethnic armed group alliance Federal Political Negotiation Consultative Council that have not yet signed the nationwide ceasefire agreement with the SAC met in Shan State's Mongla on 15 December, which was also confirmed by junta's spokesman Major General Zaw min Tun.
The KIA did not take part in the meeting, KIA spokesman Lt. Col. Naw Bu told Radio Free Asia.
This inter-ethnic conflict is likely to continue, including the displacement of thousands of people, as there has been no attempt to negotiate an end to the conflict.
Karenni State
The military coup gave rise to a people's uprising and in turn morphed into open rebellion as the junta's repression became unbearable, in a situation similar to the crisis in Chin State.
The Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF) was formed to consolidate the scattered resistance forces at the end of May following the serious fighting that began in northern Kayah, also known as, Karenni State on 21 May which soon spread to Pekhon and Moebye townships in southern Shan State.
The KNDF has a total of 19 battalions and there are several PDFs in the region not affiliated to KNDF but work with each other as allies.
On 16 July, the KNDF and Karenni Army (KA), the armed wing of the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), joined hands in an armed engagement against the junta troops near the village of Nan Phe in Bawlake Township, and since then the two Karenni armed groups have been cooperating in their resistance war.
KNPP Chairman Abel Tweed told Kantharawaddy Times in an interview on 10 October that cooperation with the KNDF, which originated from the people's uprising, provides the best opportunity to be successful in waging a war to uproot the military dictatorship
The KA has grown from 2,000 armed troops, when a ceasefire was signed in 2012 during the President Thein Sein era, to 8,000 in just a few months after the coup, due to the enthusiastic participation of the youth in the rebellion against the military junta.
The junta's offensive to quell the resistance is ongoing and shows no sign of abating.
Karen State
From the outset part of the Karen National Union/ Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA) has supported the anti-coup protesters, although the leadership headed by Mutu Say Poe was somehow reluctant and sticks to the nationwide ceasefire signed in October 2015, indicating a willingness to talk to the junta.
Before the coup, there was fighting due to the junta's road-building intrusion into Karen territories, and this then intensified after the coup in the Brigade 5, Hpapun area and later spread to all six Brigades.
The KNLA had previously occupied two other Myanmar military bases in Mutraw District, the area under the control of Brigade 5, at Thee Mu Hta and Thaw Lei Hta on 27 March and 27 April, respectively.
On 9 September 2021, KNLA Brigades 3 and 5 captured a Myanmar Army camp in Kyaukkyi Township in Bago Region.
In August alone, more than 200 battles between Karen forces and the military occurred in the Brigades 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 areas.
The KNU said there were a total of 481 battles in October and November, this year in all its Brigades caused by the Myanmar Army increasing military operations despite its declared ceasefire.
The KNU’s Mutraw (Papun) District, the KNLA 5th Brigade, recorded 355 clashes in October and November, according to Karen News.
On December 8, KNU Central officially announced that they, in cooperation with PDFs, had been fighting against the junta army in Karen State.
In Pulaw Township under the control of the KNU, a combined force of PDF and KNU attacked about 100 junta soldiers invading the area, according to a Mizzima report on 12 December.
On 15 December armed conflict broke out between SAC and a joint force of KNLA and PDF, where six junta troops were said to be killed. The latest clash before the year-end occurred because the SAC troops detained 20 political activists who had taken refuge in KNU controlled area, said the residents.
As the year ends, KNLA and Myanmar Army fighting was the most intense in comparison to that of the EAOs in other ethnic states.
Mon State
The situation in Mon State after the coup is different from other states and divisions.
The Mon Unity Party (MUP) which won 12 seats in the 2020 national election did quite well for a small state in comparison with other ethnic parties. But in the aftermath of the February military coup, it has collaborated with the military junta SAC dividing the Mon people between those for and against the collaboration.
Following its alliance with the new regime, the party were given one seat at the union level and one at the state level under the SAC. On June 1, in one new initiative, they renamed the bridge which connects Mawlamyine and Belu Island from the “General Aung San Bridge” to “Thanlwin Bridge”, according to a Transnational Institute report of 2 November.
According to ISP-Myanmar, a total of nine PDFs were counted in Mon State. The sole EAO for the Mon, New Mon State Party (NMSP), a signatory of the nationwide ceasefire agreement, has been observing the truce which it signed a few years ago and is banking on political dialogue with the junta, together with the other signatory EAOs.
Thus, no armed clashes occurred between the NMSP and SAC troops. But clashes did happen with the KNLA whose troops also operated in some parts of Mon State and the newly formed PDF on a minimal scale.
For example, according to the NUG's Ministry of Defence compiled conflict data for June, July and August, six armed clashes, 10 explosions occurred and 13 SAC troops were killed by assassination.
Given the overall state of intense conflict in the country, Mon State can be considered relatively calm.
Newly formed PDFs, local resistance
Following the formation of the NUG on 16 April, in the aftermath of the military coup, its armed wing the People's Defence Force (PDF) was formed on 5 May.
However, the PDFs are not the only newly-formed resistance groups as local resistance groups sprouted up in their hundreds across the country in ethnic states and as well divisions or regions.
According to an ISP-Myanmar report of 28 October, Myanmar's conflict observers estimated some 120 to 300 resistance groups were counted, with a total estimated troop strength of between 20,000 and 30,000.
By conservative estimates the PDF group distribution according to the ISP-Myanmar report on 20 October is as follows:
Sagaing Division 30; Magwe Division 28; Kayah State 27; Mandalay Division 22; Chin State 14; Ayeyawady Division 14; Tanintharyi Division 11; Mon State 9; Yangon Division 8; Shan State 6; Bago Division 6; Kachin State 3; Karen State 1; Arakan State 1; Naypyitaw 1; Others 12.
Other groups involved are All Burma Independence Army (ABIA); Area-21 Revolution Network; Bamar People's Liberation Army (BPLA); Burmese Mainland Resistance Alliance Force; Eagle Brigade; PDF-TC; People's Revolutionary Association (PRA); Special Attacking Force - Upper Burma (SAF); Spring Revolution Alliance (SRA); Spring Revolution Brothers Network; Student Armed Force; Dictatorship Revolution People's Army.
ISP armed conflict, civilian casualties
According to the ISP-Myanmar 7 December, after the coup in February until December 3, there were no less than 1,948 armed engagements between the SAC troops and resistance groups and no less than 286 civilians were killed. From the armed engagement, nearly 1,000 clashes happened within the last three months, with September monitored with 344 clashes, the highest in the year.
The breakdown of armed clashes countrywide were: February 43; March 172, April 41; May 231; June 54; July 214; August 195; September 344; October 336; November 302; and December 16.
After the coup until December 3, no less than 1,638 armed clashes occurred with the EAOs in Kachin State, Karen State and northern and southern Shan State and so on. The armed clashes in ethnic states reduced by 38% in November in comparison to October. At least 188 clashes were counted in the ethnic states of which 83% or 151 clashes happened in the KNU Brigade 5 area.
The breakdown of armed clashes that happened after the coup with the EAOs in ethnic states was: February 43; March 172; April 40; May 218; June 26; July 192; August 158; September 148; October 301; November 188; and December 6.
The breakdown of armed clashes of the PDF and the junta troops for May is 28; June 36; July 28; August 37; September 63; October 44; November 116; and December 12.
The number of civilians killed related to the PDF and junta troops clashes were on May 8; June 28; July 4; August 11; September 38; October 20; November 31; and December 1.
PDF attacks on junta forces were highest in November with 116 clashes. During eight months not less than 365 engagements were registered. From it, 64% of the clashes were after the NUG declared a resistance war. The reason for heightened armed engagement in November was because the military junta launched operation “Anawrathar” in the PDF strongholds of Chin State, Sagaing Division and Depeyin Township,
where not less than 20 civilians were killed. During the eight months of armed engagement, at least 141 civilian deaths were counted. The data compilation on combatant deaths and wounded were, however, not included, according to ISP-Myanmar report of 7 December.
SAC combatant, civilian casualties
The combatant casualty comprehensive data for the whole year so far has not been compiled as the junta and its adversaries only disseminate partial reports sporadically.
However, casualty figures for the whole year until October 21 according to a junta announcement of 23 October, listed the total deaths as 1,337 persons of which 1,155 were civilians, 75 junta soldiers, 93 policemen, and 14 government employees, according to ISP-Myanmar report of 23 November.
On 9 September, in a junta press conference briefing to diplomats, the junta made known that there were 1,190 killed, of which 406 were accused as junta's spies, 252 USDP members and backers, 140 government servants and security personnel, 322 township, quarter and village administrators, and 69 victims of explosive attacks.
But the NUG's Ministry of Defence causality figures for June to September differed tremendously from the junta's data.
NUG conflict and casualty statistics
From June to 7 November, the NUG said 2,530 battles and conflicts have occurred. By battles and conflicts, they mean armed clashes, atrocities against civilians, explosions, assassinations, and so forth. During the said period 908 civilian deaths and 356 wounded; and 2,941 SAC troops killed were registered, according to ISP-Myanmar report of 23 November.
The breakdown of battles and conflicts were: in June 374, July 355, August 443, September 690, and October 668.
The breakdown of civilian deaths was: June 159, July 199, August 73, September 164, and October 313.
The breakdown of SAC deaths was: in June 387, July 743, August 580, September 768, and October 463.
The breakdown of civilian wounded was: in June 92, July 47, August 45, September 109, and October 63.
Displacement, refugees, rights
According to an Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) of Burma report: “As of December 14, (1339) people are now confirmed killed by this junta coup. AAPP compiled and documented (10) fallen heroes today. These (10) fallen heroes from Myaung Township and Shwebo Township in Sagaing Region, Kanpetlet Township and Mindat Township in Chin State were killed on previous days and documented today.”
“As of December 14, a total of (8009) people are currently under detention. (389) people have been sentenced in person, of them, 36 have been sentenced to death (incl. 2 children). 1964 are evading arrest warrants. 118 people have been sentenced in absentia, of them 39 sentenced to death in absentia. In total 75 were sentenced to death, in person and absentia.”
“Of the total 593,000 internally displaced people in Myanmar, more than 223,000 have been displaced by armed conflict and unrest since 1 February 2021 - a record high – while the numbers of refugees who have fled to neighbouring countries remain at some 22,000,” according to a UNHCR report of 1 November.
Perspective
Myanmar is in dire straits due to the escalating conflict and fallout from the coup, coupled with the disruption and restrictions imposed as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the World Bank noted an 18% decline in the economy in 2021.
Aside from the heightened armed conflict and urban guerrilla warfare in the country, a legitimacy contest between the SAC and NUG is underway, with the UN, ASEAN and various international forums seemingly reluctant to choose either party.
Given the growing crisis, clashes look set to increase as the stalemate worsens in 2022.
